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This thesis seeks to demonstrate that Japan can best satisfy its international 
security interests by assuming a combatant role in current and future multinational 
military coalitions.  The thesis labels this alternative military posture “martial 
internationalism.”  An understanding of how Japanese military policy serves its overall 
international security interests is a central concern of this thesis.  Japan’s international 
security interests are defined as: (1) shaping a stable international security environment, 
(2) supporting the United Nations, and (3) upholding the Japan-United States alliance.  
Factors considered in this argument include trends in Japan’s postwar military policy 
evolution and recent military activities and developments.  The nature of Japan’s current 
domestic military policy debate is analyzed in terms of relevant political, social, military, 
and economic perspectives.  Regional and international ramifications of a more militarily 
assertive Japan are explored.  The thesis investigates the potential for martial 
internationalism to realize Japan’s international security interests and to permit a greater 
Japanese military contribution to the ongoing War on Terrorism.  Finally, the thesis 
offers specific recommendations for both Japan and the United States toward 
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Since 1952, Japan has sought to regain the international respect and prestige it 
enjoyed prior to its era of imperial adventurism.  Today, in the face of a burgeoning 
multipolar geopolitical system and a renewed affirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance, 
demands for Japan to come to terms with and exercise its military power in support of 
multinational coalitions have become more pressing.  The Japanese practice of 
“checkbook diplomacy” is becoming increasingly untenable as it fails to achieve Japan’s 
international security interests.  These international security interests are defined here as: 
(1) shaping a stable international security environment; (2) supporting the United 
Nations; and (3) upholding the Japan-United States alliance.  Accordingly, this thesis 
seeks to demonstrate that Japan can best satisfy these international security interests by 
assuming a combatant role in current and future multinational military coalitions.  The 
thesis labels this alternative military posture “martial internationalism.” 
On one hand, Japan faces considerable domestic and regional opposition to the 
use of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in any but the most limited missions.  
These interests tend to favor a pacifist Japanese military orientation.  Conversely, 
reasoned and legitimate use of its military in support of the interests of the international 
community presents Japan with a significant opportunity to bolster its prestige and 
leadership position in global affairs.  In spite of this, many people fear that increased 
military activity could lead to a resurgence of Japanese militarism or, to a lesser degree, a 
military posture of autonomy.  Because of these conflicting influences, Japan remains in 
a state of virtual paralysis regarding its national military policy − a military posture the 
thesis labels “static ambivalence.” 
Yet, history shows that despite this ambivalent attitude, Japanese military policy 
has evolved significantly since the end of the Second World War.  This is especially true 
in the last ten years.  Shifts from Japan’s initial postwar pacifism were few in number but 
dramatic in their effect, demonstrating a tendency over time toward fewer constraints and 
greater flexibility of action.  During the early years of the Cold War, Japan focused 
almost solely on economic growth and recovery while only reluctantly succumbing to 
 xiv
American pressures to provide for its own defense.  When Japan achieved economic 
power in the 1970s, its military policy became even more connected to the other two 
pillars of the comprehensive security triad: diplomacy and trade.  This forced wider the 
gap between Japanese and American views of the alliance.  Later, Soviet, then Chinese 
and North Korean security threats prompted Japan to assert itself more in the military 
arena.  These actions brought the nation into greater harmony with American global 
defense strategies and greatly strengthened the alliance in the 1990s.  Finally, with the 
recent advent of the War on Terrorism, Japan has received a momentous opportunity to 
reform its military policy and embark on a renewed path toward becoming a “normal” 
nation.   
Before this is ever possible, Japan must overcome an enormously divisive internal 
debate concerning its military policies.  Essential to this debate is the resolution of three 
contentious issues: constitutional revision (especially Article 9 that prohibits war), the 
right of collective defense, and the use of force by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.  
Furthermore, the current government is confronted by a gridlock of competing political 
factors.  Among these are party interests, public pressures, excessive bureaucratic power, 
and the problematic nature of Japanese consensus-based decision making.  In addition, 
Japan’s economy is beset by troubles and faces a highly uncertain future.  Given the 
Japanese government’s long-standing focus on economic security over military security, 
this situation portends further difficulties in effectively developing future national 
military policies.  Last, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are plagued with problems 
including inadequacies for coalition warfare and a limited input into the policy-making 
process. 
Therefore, Japan requires a new military posture in order to satisfy competing 
domestic demands while achieving its international security goals.  A pacifist option is 
unrealistic while an autonomous posture is too provocative and potentially destabilizing.  
Efforts to find a compromise in the form of static ambivalence have worked in the past, 
but owing to constitutional restrictions, are becoming increasingly complicated and 
unable to meet the international security challenges of the post-Cold War world.  Clearly, 
the best alternative is to find a middle ground between the policy paralysis of static 
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ambivalence and the overt aggressiveness of an autonomous posture.  It is here that the 
thesis presents the case for Japanese martial internationalism as a possible solution to this 
strategic dilemma. 
This posture represents an assertive yet cooperative potential Japanese military 
posture.  It envisions full Japanese military participation within multilateral security 
arrangements as well as within UN-sanctioned coalition operations.  Japan would assume 
a greater share of its own national defense while remaining allied to the United States.  
The Japanese constitution would be revised to permit military activities accepted as 
norms by the international community and in accordance with the United Nations 
Charter.  In essence, Japan would be a militarily “normal” nation, but one bound to -- and 
a vital component of -- international security regimes.  In this way, a domestically 
acceptable compromise is attained while enabling Japan to play an active military role in 
the international community. 
Martial internationalism supports all three of Japan’s international security 
interests.  First, by contributing military power to UN-sanctioned multinational coalitions 
and peacekeeping operations, it actively supports the shaping of stable international 
security environment.  Such results are not possible by Japan acting unilaterally or even 
bilaterally within the Japan-U.S. alliance.  Second, martial internationalism dynamically 
supports the United Nations by supplying a level of effort commensurate with Japan’s 
capability to provide.  Third, the posture upholds the Japan-U.S. alliance by permitting 
collective security arrangements with U.S. forces and active support of American 
operations in combat operations. 
  Martial internationalism does not disrupt the strategic balance of power in East 
Asia.  Although China and North Korea represent the most likely sources of opposition, 
these concerns are not overpowering enough to prevent the adoption of the posture.  
Instead, the support of the United States, Southeast Asia, and the global community as 
represented by the United Nations all outweigh the mitigating factors of countries 
opposed to, or apprehensive of, increased Japanese military activity. 
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In conclusion, Japan’s position in the world bestows upon it special 
responsibilities in the area of international security.  As one of the primary recipients of 
the benefits of the international political and economic system, Japan is obligated to 
provide for the integrity of the system.  As recent events have shown, the United States 
cannot preserve peace and prosperity throughout the world single-handedly.  A military 
posture that simply ensures Japan’s territorial defense is not enough.  Japan requires a 
military policy that enhances its global leadership, prestige, and honor by fully supporting 
the interests of the international community and by sustaining the strength of the Japan-
U.S. alliance. 
This thesis offers a glimpse of one potential Japanese strategic design capable of 



























“Japanese will pay money, perhaps break a sweat, but never 
spill a drop of blood.  Why is that?”  
--U.S. Ambassador Michael Armacost 
to LDP leader Keiichi Miyazawa, 19901 
 
Since 1952, Japan has sought to regain the international respect and prestige it enjoyed 
prior to its era of imperial adventurism.  Under the watchful protection of the United States, 
Japan accomplished an astonishing industrial recovery that elevated it to the status of a global 
economic superpower.  In this same period, however, Japan also underwent a dramatic 
rearmament process that restored its position as a major regional military power.  Throughout 
this renewal, the United States, Japan’s neighbors, and the Japanese people themselves all 
approached the issue of Japanese military power with ambivalence and anxiety. 
Now, in the face of a burgeoning multipolar geopolitical system and a renewed 
affirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance, demands for Japan to come to terms with and exercise 
its military power in support of multinational coalitions have become more pressing.  Major 
world powers increasingly criticize Japan’s practice of “checkbook diplomacy,” a negative 
attitude that significantly hinders Japan’s progress toward becoming a world leader.2  On one 
hand, Japan faces considerable domestic and regional opposition to the use of the Japanese 
Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in any but the most limited missions.  Conversely, reasoned and 
legitimate use of its military in support of the interests of the international community presents 
Japan with a significant opportunity to bolster its prestige and leadership position in global 
affairs.  As a result of these conflicting influences, Japan remains in a state of virtual paralysis 
regarding its national military policy. 
Taking this into account, this thesis argues that Japan can best satisfy its international 
security interests by assuming a combatant role in current and future multinational military 
coalitions.  The thesis labels this alternative military posture “martial internationalism.” 
                                                 
1 Maeda Tetsuo, The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan’s Military Force, (Chicago: Edition Q 
Inc., 1995), 285. 
2 National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), East Asian Strategic Review 2002, (Tokyo: National 
Institute for Defense Studies, 2002), 16. 
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A. JAPAN’S SECURITY INTERESTS   
An understanding of how Japanese military policy serves its overall international 
security interests is a critical subject of this thesis.  Japan is confronted with a variety of options 
concerning its future national military policy.  Japan’s strategy of comprehensive security and 
its firm commitment to the Japan-U.S. alliance served its national interests extraordinarily well 
during the years of postwar recovery and the Cold War era.3  Since 1991, however, this 
strategy has developed into what this thesis labels “static ambivalence.”  This description 
reflects Japan’s continued support of the U.S. alliance mingled with an indecisive approach 
toward what role Japanese military power should play within both the alliance and the new 
world order. 
In consequence, Japan is becoming increasingly aware of the challenges it faces in the 
dramatically altered political, strategic, and economic global environment of the 21st century.  
Such trends have been especially noticeable in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 and the wave of security-related legislation addressed by the Japanese 
government.  Unmistakably, these changed circumstances have prompted Japan to reevaluate 
its future. 
At the present time, Japan possesses sufficient military strength from its own forces and 
from those of the United States to effectively deter any major attack upon its homeland.  
Accordingly, this thesis will focus on the relationship between Japanese military policy and its 
ability to uphold its international security interests rather than those simply concerned with 
national defense.  These international security interests are defined here as: (1) shaping a stable 
international security environment, (2) supporting the United Nations, and (3) upholding the 





                                                 
3 Michael J. Green and Richard J. Samuels, Recalculating Autonomy: Japan’s Choices in the New 
World Order, NBR Analysis, Volume 5, No. 4, (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1994). 
3 
1. Shaping a Stable International Security Environment 
The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) states that the fundamental principles of Japanese 
defense policy are:4 
• Maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy 
• Not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries 
• Upholding civilian control 
• Adhering to the three non-nuclear principles5 
• Maintaining firmly the Japan-U.S. security arrangements 
Within this framework of principles and the tenets of the Japanese constitution, Japan 
maintains a defensive capability in the form of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF or 
SDF) and other national security assets.  Although Japanese prefer the term “defensive 
capabilities” to “military,” for greater simplicity the term “military” will be used here.  This 
distinction is important to note since recent controversial statements by Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi indicate a growing acceptance of the fact that the JSDF is in fact a 
“military” in the traditional sense of the word.6  Japan’s military serves three primary 
capacities.  First, it provides Japan with the ability to prevent direct or indirect aggressions 
against its homeland.  The JDA summarizes this traditional role simply as providing for 
“national defense.”  Second, the Japanese military provides national means for coping with 
“large scale disasters and various other situations.”  Providing relief efforts in the face of 
disasters is a clearly defined mission.  “Various other situations” is described as responding to 
security threats in the “areas surrounding Japan” indicating a regional focus.  The third role of 
the Japanese military is to contribute to the “creation of a more stable security environment.” 
The first two roles pertain to purely territorial concerns and thus will not be dealt with 
in great detail here.  Northeast Asia continues to remain a region fraught with political and 
military tensions.  The region particularly suffers from the lack of any binding international 
security arrangements.  The surrogate for such a system is a limited series of American bilateral 
alliances.  As an additional consideration, Japan’s geography as a resource-poor archipelagic 
                                                 
4 Quoted from the JDA website [Online] at <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.html> [28 August 2002]. 
5 Japan will not manufacture, possess, or permit the basing of nuclear weapons within the country. 
6 “Koizumi Hails Peaceful Resolution, BBC News website [Online] at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1293772.stm> [3 September 2002]. 
4 
state makes it heavily dependent upon sea-borne access to the global market for its national 
livelihood and prosperity. 
This thesis is most concerned with the third role, that of Japan’s declared desire to use 
its defensive capabilities to shape the international security situation.  The JDA describes 
“contribution to creation of a more stable security environment” in the following statements: 7 
a.  Contribute to efforts for international peace through 
participation in international peace cooperation activities, and 
contribute to promotion of international cooperation through 
participation in international disaster relief activities.  
b.  Continue to promote security dialogues and exchanges 
among defense authorities to enhance mutual confidence with 
countries, including neighboring states.  
c.  Cooperate with efforts of the United Nations and other 
international organizations in the areas of arms control and 
disarmament for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and missiles, as well as 
controlling and regulating conventional weapons, including 
land mines. 
And also in reference to the postures to be maintained by the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces:8 
The Self-Defense Forces must be capable of participating in 
international peace cooperation activities and international 
disaster relief activities in a timely and appropriate manner to 
contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the 
international community. 
These statements, though largely unspecific, unmistakably assert Japan’s belief that the 
military can be used, within the restrictions of the fundamental principles, to support operations 
that further the security interests of the international community.  Such intent can be translated 
as “shaping a stable international security environment.” 
                                                 
7 Quoted from the JDA website [Online] at <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.html> [28 August 2002]. 
8 Ibid. 
5 
2. Supporting the United Nations 
Although the “international community” remains a nebulous construct, the United 
Nations (UN) best represents it.  Among the host of organizations that are multinational in 
composition and interests, only the United Nations can truly claim to symbolize the security 
interests of all the nations of the world.  The United Nations Charter and its many declarations 
advocate a wide variety of humanitarian issues.  All of these activities are firmly supported by 
Japan.  In this context, however, “supporting the United Nations” will refer to Japan’s active 
efforts to prevent actions or developments that threaten the peaceful relations between states or 
peoples of the world, especially those proscribed by the United Nations. 
 
3. Upholding the Japan-U.S. Alliance 
Since 1952, Japan has pragmatically upheld its alliance with the United States for a 
variety of reasons.  Economically, the relationship gives Japan access to the world’s largest 
market for its exports.  Politically, it allows Japan the benefit of close association with what 
became in the post-Cold War era the world’s only superpower.  Socially, the alliance fosters a 
free exchange of people and ideas between two relatively dissimilar cultures.  Strategically, the 
alliance provides Japan with defense from external aggression.  Going further, the JDA states: 9 
This close cooperative bilateral relationship based on the Japan-
U.S. Security Arrangements, facilitates Japanese efforts for 
peace and stability of the international community, including 
promotion of regional multilateral security dialogues and 
cooperation, as well as support for various United Nations 
activities. 
The Japan-U.S. alliance is a critical source of Japanese political and economic strength.  
It serves as the backbone for security in the Asia-Pacific region.  Significantly, it also affords 
Japan a vehicle through which to exercise its support of American and United Nations interests 
in preserving peace and stability throughout the world. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate why “martial internationalism” can best satisfy 
Japan’s security interests.  To do this, it will reveal the numerous domestic and foreign factors 
6 
that shape Japanese military policy.  In addition, it will attempt to determine the likely 
implications of Japan adopting such a controversial military posture.  Accordingly, the thesis 
undertakes a methodological approach that starts by asking the following pertinent questions: 
 
• What trends can be discerned from the evolution of contemporary Japanese 
defense policy? 
• What is the nature of Japan’s current military policy debate? 
• What are the potential domestic and international ramifications of Japan 
assuming a combatant role in multinational coalition operations? 
• How can assuming such a posture satisfy Japan’s security interests better than 
its present condition of static ambivalence? 
• Why is the ongoing War on Terrorism an ideal starting place for Japan to 
implement a new military posture such as martial internationalism? 
In an organized manner, each of these critical questions will be addressed in succeeding 
chapters.  Chapter Two establishes a foundation for the remainder of the thesis by describing 
the evolution of Japan’s contemporary military policy.  In this examination, the chapter 
demonstrates that despite considerable domestic and foreign resistance, Japanese military 
policy has inexorably become less constrained and more capable of action in international 
affairs. 
Building upon this historical foundation, Chapter Three examines the nature of Japan’s 
current military policy debate.  The chapter begins by illustrating the critical military policy 
issues of constitutional revision, collective defense, and the exercise of military force.  Next, the 
present political, economic, and military situations in Japan are discussed in relation to its 
national military policy.  Finally, the chapter closes by exploring the difficulties inherent to 
three popular military postures: pacifist internationalism, autonomy, and continued static 
ambivalence.  Each alternative posture is examined in terms of its potential implications as well 
as its ability to satisfy Japan’s security interests.  
With an appreciation of Japan’s contemporary state of affairs and an awareness of 
alternative military postures, Chapter Four presents the case for martial internationalism.  First, 
the chapter offers a description of the strategy and its potential domestic effects.  Next, the 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
7 
thesis discusses Japan’s most important foreign relations and how martial internationalism 
might affect them.  This is completed in terms of likely sources of foreign opposition, anxiety, 
and encouragement.  Finally, the posture’s ability to secure Japan’s international security 
interests is examined in reference to the ongoing War on Terrorism.   
Chapter Five ends the thesis by summarizing the argument and by offering conclusions 
regarding the future utility of martial internationalism.  It finishes by presenting specific 




In Japan, no subject is as divisive as that of national military policy.  It is largely for this 
reason that static ambivalence has prevailed for so long.  Nonetheless, given the changing 
geopolitical environment faced by Japan, the nation must modify its military posture 
appropriately to cope with an uncertain future.  This thesis does not seek to patronize, provoke, 
or antagonize Japanese regarding their concerns in this highly sensitive area.  Rather, it seeks to 
offer an alternative, if somewhat controversial, vision regarding their country’s future military 
policy. 
Japan’s position in the world bestows upon it special responsibilities in the area of 
international security.  As one of the primary recipients of the benefits of the international 
political and economic system, Japan is obligated to provide for the integrity of the system.  A 
military posture that simply ensures Japan’s territorial defense is not enough.  Japan requires a 
military policy that enhances its global leadership, prestige, and honor by fully supporting the 
interests of the international community and by sustaining the strength of the Japan-U.S. 
alliance. 
For the United States, Japan remains its most important ally in Asia, and perhaps the 
world.  As recent events have shown, the United States cannot preserve peace and prosperity 
throughout the world single-handedly.  Although the American military currently enjoys an 
unprecedented global reach and combat capability, allied contributions and multinational 
coalitions remain essential to international security.  For this reason, any potential shift in the 
8 
military posture of Japan is a critical concern of U.S. strategic planners.  This thesis offers a 

























II. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE MILITARY POLICY 
Japanese military policy has evolved significantly since the end of the Second World 
War.  Major shifts from Japan’s initial postwar pacifism were few in number but dramatic in 
their effect.  The overall pattern of development has been one of reaction to external pressures, 
either from Japan’s American ally or from changes to its perceived threat environment.  As a 
result, the history of Japan’s military policy evolution demonstrates a tendency over time 
toward fewer constraints and greater flexibility of action.  This chapter illustrates these trends 
by describing the foremost proceedings of the postwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. 
  
A. OCCUPATION AND ANTIMILITARISM (1945 – 1954) 
 
1. The Imperial Legacy 
The ascendancy of modern militarism in Japan occurred due to many factors.  First, 
combined pressures of domestic and international economic turmoil appeared to threaten 
Japan’s progress toward achieving industrial parity with the West.  The weakness of the Taisho 
Democracy (1912-1926) and its seeming inability to control these economic failures led many 
to call for a more authoritarian government.  Many Japanese envied the apparent success of 
fascism in Italy, and later Germany.  They regarded these new regimes as positive examples for 
an alternative government that could solve Japan’s problems.  Furthermore, militarists in 
Japanese society worried over secular ideas concerning the emperor that had arisen during 
Taisho’s intellectualism.  They felt these beliefs clashed with the precepts of the state Shinto 
religion and undermined the spiritual power of the emperor.  Finally, external forces such as the 
rising threat of Chinese nationalism prompted a Japanese military response.  Taken as a whole, 
these factors, in combination with the aforementioned reality of Japanese military autonomy, 
resulted in the restructuring of Japan along fiercely militaristic principles.10 
The ascendancy of the militarists had far reaching consequences.  Leftist or anti-
imperial criticisms of the government were violently suppressed.  Drawing upon the historical 
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precedents set by the Tokugawa regime and its internal secret police, the metsuke, the Imperial 
Japanese government revitalized its own “thought police” in the form of the kempeitai.  Use of 
the kempeitai and various “neighborhood associations” enabled the government to firmly 
establish its presence among the people, monitor their activities, and threaten punishment for 
incorrect behaviors.11  An additional influence upon society during this period was the further 
homogenizing of the Japanese population through military service.  Young men from all over 
Japan were brought together in the service of the emperor strengthening government claims of 
national and spiritual unity. 
Beginning with territorial disputes with China over Manchuria in 1931, by 1937 Japan 
was fully at war throughout the Asian continent progressing as far south as Vietnam.  
Remarkably, however, Japan negotiated a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.  With the 
signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, Japan allied with Germany and Italy forming 
the Axis coalition.  This development united the conflict in Europe with that of Asia.  
Subsequently, when Japan’s drive into China became frustrated, its leaders made the fateful 
strategic mistake of attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines in 
1941.12  Through 1942, Japan rapidly enlarged its territorial conquests throughout the Pacific in 
an attempt to create an “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” that would establish a Japanese 
economic autarky and provide the empire with the industrial potential necessary to complete its 
conquest of China.  Throughout this period, Japan embraced a philosophy of pan-Asianism and 
attempted to justify its actions to its new subjects as “liberating” them from Western colonial 
and racial oppression.  Despite these claims, non-Japanese peoples within the empire 
experienced quite a different reality. 
Driven by an ideology of twisted bushido, emperor-worship, and a dogmatic belief in 
their racial uniqueness, divinity, and superiority, the Japanese military during this time 
discredited itself with a long list of atrocious crimes against humanity, a legacy that taints Japan 
to the present day.13  For their newly “liberated” subjects, this meant the harsh suppression of 
political autonomy, prohibition of local cultural practices, and the often-brutal treatment of 
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prisoners and laborers.  Conquered populations and captured enemies alike suffered a wide 
scope of inhuman treatment by the Japanese military.  Among these practices was slavery, 
forced prostitution of women, torture, rape, summary executions, and human experimentation 
using chemical and biological warfare agents.14  Clearly, the militarists of the 1930’s 
succeeded in eradicating Japan’s traditions of chivalry that had prevailed in its previous wars. 
In the end, Japan’s adventure into Pacific hegemony was short-lived with the massive 
military response of the United States.  From 1942 to 1945, U.S. forces succeeded in stripping 
Japan of its overseas possessions, isolating the home islands from all economic support, and 
bombing the nation into ruins.  On August 14, 1945, the war concluded with Japan’s 
unconditional surrender to the Allies following the combined atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki and the threat of Soviet invasion from the north. 
Japan’s experience with militarism and imperial expansion brought disastrous results.  
Between 1937 and 1945, Japan suffered approximately 2.3 million battlefield casualties and 
over 800,000 civilian deaths.  Over 70 percent of its pre-war industrial capacity was destroyed 
and American bombing devastated virtually every Japanese city except Kyoto.15  Politically, 
Japan was reviled by most of the international community.  For the first time in its history, 
Japan suffered the humiliating loss of its sovereignty and the unprecedented occupation of its 
home islands by foreign military forces. 
 
2. “Remaking Japan” 
The occupation of Japan by the United States attempted to stamp out militarism in 
Japanese society.  Confronted by the terrible consequences of its failure in the Second World 
War, Japan almost unanimously embraced the hope for salvation offered by its American 
conquerors.  Many American policy-makers declared their desire for Japan to become an 
“Asian Switzerland” and set upon the task of “remaking” Japanese society.16 
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From 1945 to 1947, the United States vigorously pursued dual policies to eliminate 
Japan’s war potential and punish it for past aggression, while at the same time creating a strong, 
capitalist, and democratic ally in Asia.17  Although an international “Far Eastern Commission” 
had been established in Washington representing all of the countries involved in the war against 
Japan, this organization coordinating the reconstruction of Japan existed more as an elaborate 
façade.18  In all vital matters, the United States firmly directed the course of affairs in Japan 
through General Douglas MacArthur in his office of Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP).  Moreover, from 1945 until 1951, the United States asserted its control over 
the Japanese transformation process by ensuring that, apart from very limited contact with 
British occupation forces, Japan remained “virtually isolated from the rest of the world.”19  The 
United States widened Japanese support for its actions by utilizing Japanese civilian institutions 
to carry out SCAP directives rather than subjecting Japan to direct military control.  This 
practice, in conjunction with the extraordinary preservation of the emperor, limited numbers 
and locations of occupation forces, and the generally benevolent attitude of the Americans, as 
compared to the alternatives of being occupied by China or the Soviet Union, significantly 
aided in the process of reform and encouraged pro-American sentiment. 
The United States achieved substantial successes in reforming and demilitarizing 
Japanese society.20  SCAP efforts to democratize Japan included the prosecution of wartime 
leaders, release of political prisoners, universal suffrage, dissolution of the family-owned 
zaibatsu industrial conglomerates, promotion of labor unions, and redistributing land for 
promoting increased food production and decreasing the power of local landlords.  
Additionally, SCAP ordered many broad reforms, including demobilization of the population, 
conversion of military industries to civilian use, and the creation of non-Confucian based 
educational systems.  The demystification of the emperor as a deity on January 1, 1946, 
disbanding of “thought police,” acceptance of diverse and even leftist political opinion, and the 
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resurgence of multiple political parties further served this effort.  All of these liberal reforms 
culminated in the establishment of the bicameral National Diet and the development and 
adoption of Japan’s Constitution in 1947. 
The 1947 Constitution, chiefly drafted by idealistic Americans enamored with “New 
Deal” principles, decidedly determined the future path of Japan.  With regard to foreign 
relations and militarism, the most noteworthy characteristic of the Constitution is Article 9 that 
states:21 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as 
means of settling international disputes…land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.  
The right of the belligerency of the state will not be maintained. 
Although Article 9 was included mainly on the personal direction of MacArthur, it also 
served broader interests.  Its inclusion expressed not only the desires of the American 
government to hobble Japanese potential as an adversary and bind it to American military 
protection, but also satisfied the yearnings of the Japanese people to avoid the catastrophe of 
recurring militarism.22  In the end, however, although the policies of SCAP and the new 
constitution gave Japan the outward appearance of a liberal democracy devoted to peace, this 
idealism later produced problems for the United States as it became more embroiled in the 
geopolitical struggle of the Cold War.23 
Beginning in late 1947, the United States modified its approach to reforming Japan 
because of the burgeoning threat of the Soviet Union and international communism.  Mounting 
concerns over the global spread of communism, particularly in China and Korea, and 
difficulties experienced by European colonial powers in restoring their authority over Asian-
Pacific possessions played an important role in shifting attitudes toward Japanese 
reconstruction.  Furthermore, an increased interest in Japan was demonstrated by statements of 
American strategic planners, including George F. Kennan in the State Department and 
Undersecretary of the Army, William Draper Jr.  Their influence greatly impacted upon 
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American formulations of how Japan would be included in Washington’s overall global 
containment policy.  Specifically, Kennan illustrated Japan’s strategic potential for the United 
States in NSC 13/2.  His characterization led many to believe in the concept, later coined by 
Nakasone Yasuhiro, of Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Northwest Pacific.24 
Japanese pacifism flourished in this heated environment.  One cause was the return to 
politics of many Taisho-era internationalists.  Suppressed for over 15 years by the militarist 
government, they sought to restore Japan’s connections to the rest of the world and resisted 
U.S. plans for rearming their society.  These leaders joined with a growing number of Japanese 
in a feeling of “dual victimization.”25  They felt anger at the ruinous failures of the wartime 
militarists and spite for the Americans who they believed had ruthlessly destroyed and 
conquered Japan to further its own power interests against the Soviet Union.  The influence of 
these views was powerful and implanted a set of four “never agains” into the Japanese psyche.  
One author summarized these resolutions as:26 
 
1. Never again depend solely upon the military for achieving domestic or international 
goals. 
 
2. Never again permit the homeland to suffer mass domestic bombing. 
 
3. Never again permit the military to have influence over public policy or to threaten 
politicians, bureaucrats, or business leaders. 
 
4. Never again discount the importance of superior technology, advanced weaponry, 
and the capacity of mass production. 
 
At the same time, the United States grew ever more worried that Japanese social reform 
had gone too far and had begun to weaken Japan as a future ally.27  Such developments 
resulted in a “reverse course” within Japanese politics and society.  The “reverse course” 
occurred for a variety of reasons and began largely in late 1948.  First, it seemed that the 
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reforms were failing to contain economic turmoil or to create a lasting, coherent national 
government.  Second, the rise of Japanese labor unions, despite having been initially advocated 
by General MacArthur,28 spawned American fears that these organizations were acting as 
agents of Marxist principles.  Finally, American interest in dramatic social liberalization waned 
in favor of maintaining a stable, conservative, and capitalistic government.29  In turn, the 
Japanese themselves resisted this shift only moderately given the short span of liberalization 
efforts and the fact that leadership positions throughout society remained primarily filled by 
individuals of politically conservative outlooks. 
The advance of the “communist monolith” throughout the Asian region also justified 
the shift in American policy toward Japan.  First, in 1949, the fall of China to the communists 
brought exceptional pressures to bear upon President Harry Truman and the Democratic Party.  
Perceived as “losing China to the communists,” President Truman grew determined to avoid 
similar failures elsewhere in Asia.  This fact largely influenced the U.S. entry into the Korean 
War in 1950.  In Japan, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru deemed the Korean War a “gift from 
the gods” as over $4 billion worth of military procurement orders surged into Japanese 
industries.30  Additionally, SCAP dedicated more of its efforts to Korea and turned over almost 
all of its governing functions back to the Japanese. 
Thus from 1948 to 1954, Japan became progressively a full member of the U.S.-led 
Cold War coalition.  The primary Japanese figure directing the resurgence during this period 
was Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru.  An ex-diplomat who had been ostracized by Japan’s 
wartime leaders, he was socially conservative and a longtime outspoken advocate of close ties 
to the United States and Great Britain.31  He proved the ideal leader for shaping Japan’s post-
war economy, society, and international relations.  Yoshida placed the development and 
expansion of Japan’s economy and industry as his primary goal while conceding Japan’s 
military protection to the United States.  To accomplish this, Yoshida’s policies encouraged 
capital growth and foreign investment, curbing of radical labor movements, introduction of 
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leading edge technologies, and increased government subsidies to heavy industry.  These 
policies later became known collectively as the “Yoshida Doctrine.”32 
Amid rising international tensions, Yoshida led Japan’s return to sovereignty.33  
Beginning in 1951, both the San Francisco Peace Treaty formally ending the war with Japan 
and a Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan were signed almost 
simultaneously.  However, this did not happen without significant difficulties.34  First, 
Australia and New Zealand were concerned that Japan was getting off the hook too easily and 
feared possible resurgent Japanese militarism.  To quell this fear, John Foster Dulles, designer 
of the agreements with Japan, also arranged the tripartite ANZUS Treaty.  In addition, a U.S.-
Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded for the same reason.  In the end, despite 
assurances of war reparations, China, India, Burma and the Soviet Union all refused to accept 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed on September 8, 1951.  This demonstration of mistrust 
in the Japan-U.S. alliance by these countries, or their successors, continues to the present day.35 
The creation of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States received mixed 
reactions within Japan.  Japanese conservatives within Yoshida’s clique recognized the 
enormous potential for economic growth that association with the United States would bring.  
Since Washington had cancelled trade relations with China and the Soviet Union, it pressured 
Japan to do likewise.  In exchange, America opened its markets to Japanese goods with 
relatively few restrictions.  This served to further bolster Japan’s growing economy.  
Additionally, most Japanese were happy to be able to devote the majority of their national 
income to modernizing industry rather than spending it on costly military defenses.  The 
occupation by American forces and the intrusive SCAP office ended in 1952.  Although 
Washington coaxed Japan to rearm itself in the face of the communist threat, Yoshida deftly 
maneuvered around this citing the prohibitions contained in the new constitution.36  Yoshida 
conceded, however, to the transformation of Japan’s national police forces into the Self-
Defense Forces in 1954.  Protected under the American “nuclear umbrella,” Japan was free to 
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pursue a course of reconstruction at the relatively small expense of providing bases and 
logistical support for its new American allies.37 
All of these events did not come about without opposition from within.  Specifically, 
members of Japan’s Communist Party stated, “Japan has been subjected to U.S. imperialism 
and lost its freedom and independence”.38  Numerous riots and antigovernment activity 
continued through 1952 resulting in repressive internal security policies to control the radical 
left. 
Despite his impressive record of achievements, Yoshida failed to create a viable 
political party structure.39  He was a better administrator than parliamentarian and his 
stubbornness and unwillingness to comprise diminished his political influence.  In late 1954, 
Yoshida stepped down from power and passed the reigns to Hatoyama Ichiro, a recently 
“depurged” rightist.  Japanese ideological conflicts heightened further with the return to power 
of many other members of the “old guard” who had held positions of authority in Japan during 
the war but who had not committed serious enough crimes to merit perpetual exile from 
politics.40  Hatoyama was a popular supporter of business interests who had spent time in 
prison for his association with the wartime government.  He had only recently been permitted 
to rejoin domestic politics by SCAP.  Within a few months, Hatoyama consolidated his 
political power by combining rival parties to form the Liberal Democratic Party  (LDP) in 
1955. 
The LDP became the dominant political force in Japan for many reasons.  First, it 
shunned the divisive ideological beliefs espoused by other parties and instead focused on 
pragmatic policies that fostered economic growth.41  Second, it established a close association 
with Japanese business and industrial interests especially the new keiretsu.  The keiretsu, huge 
networks of companies linked together by common financial institutions, evolved out of the 
traditional family-owned zaibatsu.42  With the vast financial backing of these business 
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interests, the LDP found it easy to dominate a fragmented consortium of left-leaning political 
parties.43  In the end, all of these developments created the so-called “1955 system”: a powerful 
triumvirate comprised of LDP “1 ½ party” politics, the government bureaucracy, and leading 
business interests. 44  The strength of this system enabled it to endure for nearly forty years after 
its formation.   
Thus by the end of 1954, Japan was fully set to reenter the global arena on its own.  
The nine-year period of transition under the American occupation and control decisively 
established the United States as Japan’s only military ally and its foremost trading partner.  
Likewise, although Japan resumed its sovereign status its future foreign relations were colored 
by the lenses of the Cold War and evaluated in relation to the American alliance. 
 
B. JAPAN AS COLD WARRIOR (1954 – 1989) 
1. Reanimation 
From 1954 to 1989 Japan’s security and foreign policies were characterized by 
maintaining a close relationship to the United States while engaging in rapid internal economic 
development.  Fully aware of the precarious geostrategic position Japan occupied in the 
struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, Japanese leaders sought to continue 
the protection provided by the United States while carefully fostering increased regional and 
international involvement. 
The early years of the Cold War were a turbulent period for Japanese society.  
Although efforts had been taken to encourage leftist political diversity and opinions during the 
occupation years, the advent of the Cold War in Japan created attitudes of intolerance similar to 
those occurring in the United States during this time.45  Japan’s entry into the United Nations in 
1956, backed by the support of the U.S. coalition against the objections of the communist bloc 
of the Soviet Union and China, evidenced this.46  On the whole, Japan experienced deep 
political and ideological divisions that mirrored the polarization of the world as a whole 
between the coalitions of the United States and the Soviet Union.   
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The Article 9 “peace clause” contained in the 1947 Constitution in concert with the 
informal “Yoshida Doctrine” significantly affected early concepts of Japanese military policy.  
In a noteworthy hypocrisy that reflected the realities of the Cold War, although Article 9 
proclaims that Japanese “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained,” the Japanese military was never completely dismantled.47  In the face of 
American pressure, Yoshida permitted assets of the newly established Japanese Maritime 
Safety Agency (JMSA) to assist with American amphibious operations during the initial phases 
of the Korean War.48  From October 2 to December 15, 1950, 46 Japanese minesweepers and 
1200 former Imperial Japanese Navy personnel cleared mines in the waters east of Wonsan and 
other Korean ports to facilitate General MacArthur’s northward invasion.49  During these 
operations two Japanese ships were sunk, one sailor killed, and eight others injured.  
Pragmatically, both the Japanese and American governments largely suppressed public 
knowledge of Japan’s naval involvement in the Korean War. 
Among Prime Minister Yoshida’s final and most important acts were his steps to rearm 
Japan.  During the negotiation of the 1951 Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, he had conceded 
to Japan providing a measure of its own defense.  With the passage of the 1954 Self-Defense 
Forces Law, Japan converted police, security, and coastal safety forces into a defacto military.  
In conjunction with this law, Japan passed the “Ban on Overseas (Defense Force) Dispatch” to 
assuage the anxieties of domestic left as well as internationally.50  These developments enabled 
Yoshida to pursue his “doctrine” that focused on economic growth and recovery while the 
United States provided for Japan’s core security needs:  a nuclear deterrent, the ability to defeat 
invasion attempts, regional stability and unobstructed sea lanes.51 
                                                 
47 Evidence of the preservation of Imperial Navy and Army structures and personnel can be found in 
James E. Auer The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71, (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1973) and Edwin P. Hoyt,  The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WW II.  
(New York: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1985). 
48 The JMSA is Japan’s Coast Guard. 
49 Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71, 64-67. 
50 Joseph P. Keddel, Jr., The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), 32-33. 
51 Laura Stone, “Whither Trade and Security?  A Historical Perspective,” eds.  Michael J. Green and 
Patrick M. Cronin, The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future, (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1999), 252. 
20 
Later, having resurrected its military, Japanese leaders found it necessary to formally 
craft policies regarding their use.  The first such legislation was the “Basic National Defense 
Policy” of 1957.  This policy contained numerous premises that have guided Japanese military 
policies ever since.  Specifically, it sought to: 
 
1. Support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, 
thereby contributing to the realization of world peace. 
 
2. Promote the public welfare and enhance the people’s love for the country, thereby 
establishing the sound basis essential to Japan’s security. 
 
3. Develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, 
with due regard to the nation’s resources and the prevailing domestic situation. 
 
4. Deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, 
pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring 
and repelling such aggression.52 
 
Loaded with ambiguity, this policy enabled Japan to substantially increase its defense 
spending and improve overall readiness.  In doing so, however, it provoked widespread public 
outcry.  Japan experienced widespread mass protests and riots against the government and its 
policies, particularly the trends toward increasing military ties to the United States.53 
The protests and demonstrations against the government reached a climax during the 
tenure of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke.  Owing to his checkered past and involvement in the 
wartime government, Kishi was intensely hated by the Japanese political left which considered 
him “a war criminal and a thug.”54  In fact, the unpopularity of his administration was so strong 
that nearly every piece of legislation it proposed met with harsh criticism and public outcry.  
This storm even overshadowed important foreign policy decisions including Kishi’s 
announcement in 1957 that Japan would follow a course of “Asia-centered diplomacy.”55  In 
this proposal, Kishi declared that despite its close relations to the United States and its 
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unfortunate imperial legacy, Japan would unilaterally concentrate on renewing strong 
diplomatic ties and cooperative economic relationships to Asian countries. 
Although these actions demonstrated the shrewdness by which he could manipulate 
Washington, his 1960 handling of the modified Japan-U.S. Security Treaty led to his ultimate 
humiliation and downfall.56  Public support for the new treaty was extraordinarily low, and few 
believed government claims that it would be a “temporary measure until the United Nations 
could provide Japan with collective security.”57  Against widespread protests, in July Kishi 
forced through the Diet passage of the renewed treaty using police to drive opposition party 
members from the Diet chamber.  These strongman tactics led to even greater unrest and 
demonstrations causing him to cancel an impending visit by U.S. President Eisenhower.58  
Kishi subsequently resigned from office, although he remained a behind-the-scenes LDP power 
broker.  The ratification of the new treaty with the United States and Kishi’s removal from 
power represented a substantial shift in Japanese society, politics, and heralded a new and more 
liberal phase in Japanese history. 
During the 1960s, Japan maintained generally pacifistic military policies as it continued 
to focus on postwar reconstruction and economic development.  Several events demonstrated 
this trend.  First, in order to quell public unrest, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato launched an 
ambitious “income doubling plan” in 1960.59  This policy set the high goal for Japan to double 
national economic power as well as personal incomes and standards of living by the end of the 
decade.  This was to be accomplished through fostering close ties between the Japanese 
government and business, leading to the creation of a highly planned national economy.  
Second, in 1965 the Japanese press discovered that the Japanese Defense Agency had prepared 
a military operations plan called the “three arrows contingency plan” for dealing with an 
outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula.60  The government ineptly handled the leak, 
provoking mass panic and numerous conspiracy theories that the SDF was about to undertake a 
military coup.  When the matter finally settled out, the government banned the JDA from 
                                                 
56 The full text of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty can be found on the Japanese Defense 
Agency website [Online] at <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.html> [28 August 2002].  
57 Green and Samuels, Recalculating Autonomy: Japan’s Choices in the New World Order, 16. 
58 LeFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History, 320-321. 
59 Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan, 248. 
60 Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, 194. 
22 
producing similar contingency plans.  The ban lasted a remarkable thirteen years during the 
height of the Cold War. 
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, from November 1964 to July 
1972, Japan continued to pursue the “income doubling plan” while maintaining a posture of 
“low diplomacy” dedicated to building trade relationships with other countries.  These 
measures met with minimal resistance from a steadily weakening Japanese political left.  
Largely discredited because of the Sino-Soviet split and the devastating Chinese failures of the 
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, leftist opposition to LDP economic policies 
became increasingly viewed as unrealistic extremist ranting.61  Sato’s 1967 arms exports ban 
and proclamation of “Japan’s three non-nuclear principles” also diminished leftist opposition.62  
In these declarations, he stated that Japan would not sell military materiel to foreign countries 
and that Japan would not manufacture, possess, or permit the basing of nuclear weapons within 
the country.  Additionally, he announced that Japan would never permit defense spending to 
exceed one percent of the national gross domestic product (GDP), although this did not become 
official policy until 1976 under Prime Minister Miki Takeo.63  Overall, Sato’s support of a non-
nuclear, demilitarized state while advancing economically served dual purposes of appeasing 
domestic concerns while easing regional fears of a resurgent Japan. 
The United States played a crucial role in Japan’s revival during this period as its sole 
ally.  Japan-U.S. relations were marked by a fervent desire to preserve the safety afforded by 
the security treaty while expanding trade relations with America in support of the growing 
Japanese economy.  Through the early years of this period, the United States continued to 
bolster Japan’s growth by opening its markets to Japanese goods while defending Japan’s 
reentry into the world community.  Japan’s entry into the United Nations in 1956 and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964 stand as examples 
of this support.64  In contrast, not all interaction was positive during this period and budding 
signs of disagreement began to arise.  First, evidence arose that Washington provided 
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considerable financial support for the LDP in its founding years through CIA operations 
determined to ensure a stable, friendly Japanese government.65  This interference in Japan’s 
internal affairs harkened to well-remembered bitterness over intrusive SCAP policies during 
the Occupation years.  Secondly, the fiasco surrounding the 1960 security treaty modification 
caused many Americans to begin to doubt the sincerity of Japan’s commitment to containing 
communism.  This ill will festered during the Vietnam War where Japanese cooperation proved 
little more than lukewarm.66  Although Japan provided $55 million in economic assistance and 
sent medical teams to South Vietnam, many Americans became angry at Japan for amassing 
wealth and expanding its Southeast Asian markets while the Vietnam War exerted a vast drain 
upon the U.S. treasury.  Widespread anti-war protests at Japanese universities in 1968 and 1969 
acted as further evidence for Americans that the Japanese were not supporting them.67  Finally, 
throughout the 1960s, continued Japanese objections to the American control of Okinawa acted 
as an added obstacle to closer relations between the two. 
By 1969, a combination of these factors brought about a souring of Japanese-U.S. 
relations and the first indications of a more independent Japanese military policy.  In response 
to increasing domestic turmoil and the disheartening prospects for an American victory in 
Vietnam, President Nixon outlined a policy that signaled a possible future decrease in the U.S. 
military presence in Asia.  Presented within press conference remarks given on the island of 
Guam in 1969, Nixon’s “Guam Doctrine” stated that, “problems of international 
security…would be increasingly handled by…the Asian nations themselves.”68  Provoking 
apprehensions that Washington might withdraw from its security arrangement with Japan, JDA 
Director, and future prime minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro composed a controversial defense 
white paper in 1970.  Nakasone proclaimed the need for Japan to achieve a degree of “military 
autonomy” that would ensure its safety in the event of an attack by the communists.69  
Designed to curb American protests that Japan was enjoying a “free ride,” the white paper was 
prematurely introduced to a Japanese society still focused on economic growth.  It spawned a 
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storm of protests against militarization and ended the Defense Agency’s public release of 
policy until 1976. 
Japan-U.S. relations grew even more strained as a result of the so-called “Nixon 
shocks.”70  In 1971, Nixon announced his intent to normalize relations between China and the 
United States.  Shortly after, in response to domestic economic crises, he declared the 
abandonment of the gold standard.  Coming so soon after the “Guam Doctrine,” these policy 
decisions radically affected the strategic and economic plans Japan had depended upon for 
years.  Furthermore, it gave rise to feelings that the United States was acting purely on its own 
and disregarding Japanese interests and security concerns.  Finally, in 1972, some sense of 
rapprochement was reached by the long-awaited conversion of Okinawa from American to 
Japanese rule.71 
 
2. New Assertiveness 
From 1973 to 1989, Japan finally realized all of the hopes of the Meiji era and attained 
the status of an economic superpower.  With this new power also came questions concerning 
how it was to be used.  While the policies of the Yoshida Doctrine and the income doubling 
plans created a foundation for achieving success, they said little about what to do once power 
had been achieved.72  Although Japan had attained all of the original American expectations of 
a “free market fortress” in Asia, this achievement brought with it new difficulties for the 
country to confront. 
The year 1973 marked a decisive turning point for Japan due to the dramatic impact of 
the October Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent “oil shocks” it produced.73  Mainly because 
of its association with the United States, Japan was deemed an “unfriendly” state by the oil-
producing Arab states of OPEC.  This led to increased oil prices, reduced supply, and a 
shattering of all the foundations for future economic growth Japanese leaders had planned.74  
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Since, during this time, Japan depended on the region for nearly 80 percent of its oil imports, 
the striking rise in consumer and industrial costs associated with oil largely caused the collapse 
of the Tanaka cabinet and a shift in Japanese foreign policy.  Japan’s leaders quickly realized 
that they could not solely rely upon U.S. leadership for solving their external economic 
problems.  Therefore, Japan began to conduct foreign relations more unilaterally to protect its 
interests.  This new assertiveness began with Tokyo’s recognition of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) in conjunction with Israel in 1973. 
Other major events during this period propelled Japan’s movement toward a more 
independent military policy.  First, from 1976 to 1978, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo launched 
a new foreign policy strategy later dubbed the “Fukuda Doctrine.”75  Generally, this view of 
diplomacy as an essential function of economic nourishment represented the growing strength 
of the neomercantilist view in Japanese politics.  Furthermore, the concept of “omni-
directional” diplomacy it described permitted Japan great flexibility in dealing with its 
problems.76  As a result, the second and third oil shocks of mid-1979 and early 1980 found 
Japan more well-prepared resulting in less negative economic impact.  Japan’s thrust into the 
international arena found further expression in the 1980 statement of Foreign Minister Okita 
Saburo.  He stated that Japan needed to end its practice of “passive” foreign diplomacy and to 
participate in influencing the development of global conditions rather than merely reacting to 
them.77  This attitude was evidenced shortly after as Japan became one of the first world 
powers to receive PLO leader Yasser Arafat as a head of state in 1981. 
Aside from purely diplomatic changes, Japan also began to concretely transform its 
national defense policies.  Fearing an American withdrawal in Asia following the debacle of 
the Vietnam War, Japanese leaders sought greater self-sufficiency and latitude in providing for 
Japan’s protection.  Under Prime Minister Fukuda, in 1976 the JDA released the first defense 
white paper since the fiasco caused by Nakasone in 1970.  “The National Defense Program 
Outline” (NDPO) of 1976 authorized an upper limit on military spending at one percent of the 
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national GDP while encouraging technological improvements to the military.  Additionally, it 
detailed the basic overall strength of the Self-Defense Forces and formed the basis of modern 
Japanese defense policies.78  This demonstration of renewed interest in Japan’s security came 
about largely as a result of government embarrassment surrounding the defection of a Soviet 
pilot who had flown his MIG-25 easily through Japanese air defenses to land in Hokkaido the 
same year.79  Japanese leaders came under political pressure to rebuild the prestige of the JSDF 
as a viable deterrent to Soviet threats.   
Four years later, in 1980, Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi announced the adoption of 
“comprehensive security.”  This new policy called for a three-tiered approach to Japanese 
security and international relations.  The first approach sought to promote international arms 
control, free trade, and improved north-south geopolitical relations.  The second approach, 
called for strengthening ties to Japan’s allies through increased diplomatic and economic 
cooperation.  The final approach, advocated improvement of military capabilities, food security 
and the enhancement of economic productivity and export competitiveness.80  Japanese leaders 
had witnessed increasingly aggressive Soviet behavior in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
including the invasion of Afghanistan, troop deployments to the Northern Territories and 
northeast Asia, and the shooting down of a Korean airliner by Soviet fighters.  They questioned 
whether the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union had changed for 
the worse.81 
Comprehensive security attained great stature in the 1980s under the direction of Prime 
Minister Zenko Suzuki and the hawkish Nakasone Yasuhiro.  Additionally, relations between 
Japan and the United States grew stronger toward achieving the final defeat of the Soviet 
Union.  Initially, the weakness of the arrangement was evidenced in 1981 when the Japanese 
Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko made a public statement referring to Japan’s “alliance” with the 
                                                 
78 See Defense of Japan 1996, (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1996), p. 271 
79 Shibusawa, Japan and the Asian Pacific Region: Profile of Change, 95. 
80 Summarized from Peter J. Katzenstein and Okawara Nobuo, Japan’s National Security: Structures, 
Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World,  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993), 139-199 and 
Michael G. L’Estrange, The Internationalization of Japan’s Military policy: Challenges and Dilemmas for 
a Reluctant Power, 16-20. 
81 See Mike Mochizuki’s chapter on Japan in ed. Michael Mandelbaum, The Strategic Quadrangle: 
Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1995), 119-120. 
27 
United States.  After arousing a domestic storm of protest at the implications of his 
terminology, Suzuki quickly engaged in double-talk and claimed that his words had been 
misconstrued and misinterpreted.82  At the same time, he placated Washington by declaring 
that the JSDF would assume security responsibilities for Japan’s sea-lanes of communication 
(SLOC) to an outer limit of 1000 nautical miles.  Accordingly, he increased participation of the 
JSDF within numerous joint exercises with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. 
Even in the face of domestic criticisms, Japanese leaders began to actively contribute to 
improving regional security against the Soviet menace.83  In doing so, these leaders extensively 
utilized the practice of gaiatsu, or outside pressure, as a ploy to defend unpopular actions.  By 
describing their decisions as unavoidable due to outside forces (i.e. American demands), they 
absolved themselves of responsibility and directed public unhappiness away from Tokyo and 
overseas.84 
The concurrent ascension of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and President Ronald 
Reagan permitted the greatest advances in military cooperation to take place.  Quickly forging 
a close personal connection, the relationship between the two leaders was quickly dubbed the 
“Ron-Yasu” alliance.85  As tensions in the Middle East demanded more of Washington’s 
attention, Reagan relied more heavily upon Nakasone to assist in providing regional security in 
East Asia.  In addition, efforts were made to tie Japan into the U.S.-European alliance of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by encouraging greater Japanese-European 
cooperative measures.  This was seen as forming the third side of an equilateral triangle in the 
anti-Soviet alliance.  Organizations such as the unofficial, but influential, Trilateral 
Commission started in 1973 and the Asian-European Group fostered this relationship.86  
Furthermore, Japan’s naval assistance in tracking Soviet submarines became indispensable.  
Finally, significant military research partnerships were achieved in the form of an exchange of 
                                                 
82 Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View, 23-26. 
83 Ibid., 95. 
84 Smith, Japan: A Reinterpretation, 33. 
85 Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy: 1945-1990, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 144. 
86 Mendl, Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests, 31. 
28 
technology agreement in 1983 and a similar agreement concerning joint research into Strategic 
Defense Initiative potential.87 
President Reagan’s overall enthusiasm for the relationship was expressed during one of 
the first speeches of his second term on January 2, 1985.  In this speech, he stated: “There is no 
relationship more important to peace and prosperity in the world than that between the United 
States and Japan.” 
 
C. AN UNCERTAIN POWER (1989 – 2002) 
1. The Turbulent 1990s 
1989 was a year of momentous change in Japan, and the world as a whole, heralding a 
decade of uncertainty and transformations.  In a period of time, Japan experienced the death of 
Emperor Hirohito, witnessed the Tiananmen Square tragedy in China, and saw the beginning 
collapse of the bipolar world order that had shaped its patterns of success for nearly forty years.  
All of this resulted in social reordering, economic turmoil, and political turbulence and left 
many Japanese wondering what could possibly happen next.  A condensation of these changes 
demonstrates how Japan yet again undertook a search for its identity and military security in the 
post-Cold War years. 
During the 1990s, a variety of external forces acted to shape Japan’s perception of its 
security environment.  Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Japan continued to see 
itself as surrounded by potential adversaries.88  Accordingly, it did not pursue a “peace 
dividend” to the extent that the United States and other Cold War combatants did.  Whereas 
evidence could be found to confirm its suspicions, Japan’s retention of a powerful military 
occurred mainly due to bureaucratic entrenchment and an aversion to dismantling the 
expensive and high-tech military force that had been created.89  The perception of regional 
threats from China and North Korea began to take the place of the Soviet Union. 
Accordingly, several dramatic alterations to Japanese military policy occurred during 
the 1990s.  Most noteworthy was the first authorization for deploying forces overseas in 
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support of United Nations peacekeeping operations and, later, U.S.-led coalition military 
actions.  These changes signified a greater willingness by Japan to involve itself directly in 
shaping world events. 
The seeds of this process were sown in the aftermath of the Gulf War (1990-91).  Japan 
was stung bitterly by the harsh international criticism it received concerning its role in the war.  
Specifically, “the slow, indecisive, and ultimately weak efforts by [Prime Minister] Kaifu’s 
cabinet to play a responsible role in connection with the United States were a disappointment to 
many of Japan’s friends abroad.”90  One proposal in 1991 called for the creation of a 
“Peacekeeping Operations Co-Operation Corps” separate from the JSDF and thus less 
restricted by the Constitution.  This initiative quickly stalled, however, because of opposition 
by JSDF leadership and political infighting.91 
In the end, Japan eventually contributed over $13 billion to the war effort and sent 
minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after hostilities had ceased.  These actions, often 
characterized as “too little, too late,” gained little international recognition for Japan.  Japanese 
leaders realized that in order to earn international respect, they could no longer rely upon 
“checkbook diplomacy.”92  Moreover, Japan’s noticeable absence from the 1992 coalition 
victory parade in New York City “left a deep scar upon the [Japanese] psyche.”93  Intense 
debates surfaced in Japan concerning military policy resulting in the first serious discussions of 
constitutional reforms to permit overseas Japanese military activities.  
In June 1992, with great difficulties, the Japanese Diet repealed the 1954 “Ban on 
Overseas Dispatch” and enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law (also known as the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Law).  This legislation enabled the Japan to dispatch 
military personnel overseas for the first time since 1945.  However, it limited the participation 
of Japanese Self-Defense Forces to logistical or “rear area” aspects of international 
peacekeeping operations (PKO).  It stipulated that legislative approval of the Diet must occur 
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before the Prime Minister may deploy the JSDF and limits the length of any such deployment 
to two years.  Moreover, it established five restrictive prerequisites governing these potential 
deployments:94 
 
1. A cease-fire must be in place. 
 
2.   The parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the operations. 
 
3.   The activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner. 
 
4.   Participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the above conditions ceases 
to be satisfied. 
 
5.   Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person 
of the personnel. 
 
Since the passage of this legislation, Japanese military personnel have participated in 
peacekeeping operations in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Zaire, and the 
Golan Heights.95 
In March 1994, troubled by a cool relationship with the United States and the threat of 
regional crises erupting in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula, Prime Minister 
Hosokawa ordered a comprehensive defense review.  Five months later an advisory group 
published “The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 
21st Century.”96  In this report, the advisory group strongly recommended “Japan should 
extricate itself from its military policy of the past that was, if anything, passive, and henceforth 
play an active role in shaping a new order.”97  The report also recommended various 
improvements to the JSDF including streamlining units of the Ground Self-Defense Forces 
(GSDF) toward optimal use in future PKO missions.  The report also criticized the disinterest 
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of Japanese academia regarding security matters and the general apathy of Japanese youth 
concerning national defense.  It warned:98 
If the whole society forgets to pay due respect to those who are 
engaged in the defense of the country, the spiritual foundation 
of national defense and security will be lost.  History shows 
that such states did not enjoy lasting prosperity. 
The Hosokawa report had an electric effect upon both Japanese and American policy.  
Furthermore, its release coincided with the publishing of conservative politician Ozawa Ichiro’s 
“Blueprint for a New Japan.”  In this treatise, Ozawa called for Japan to become a “normal 
nation,” revise its constitution, and exercise greater autonomy in its military and foreign 
policies.99  In response, beginning in October 1994, the United States launched an intensive 
bilateral review of the security relationship, later termed the “Nye Initiative.”  The review lasted 
seven months and brought about significant changes to Japanese military policy.100  In 
November 1995, the Japan’s government revised the outdated 1976 NDPO and expanded the 
scope of Japanese defense responsibilities not only to resist an invasion of Japan itself, but also 
to respond to aggression in the geographically vague “areas surrounding Japan.”  Further steps 
were taken in April 1996 with the “Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for 21st Century” 
and the September 1997 establishment of “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” 
between the Japan and the United States.101  The “Guidelines” filled in many gaps that had 
previously existed in the Japan-U.S. military alliance strategy.  In particular, this legislation 
permitted the emergency use of Japanese military bases by American forces and provided for 
increased Japanese involvement in keeping the sea lines of communication to Japan open.102   
In recent years, Japan accomplished significant improvements in streamlining the SDF 
command system and its interoperability with U.S. forces.  First, in 1999, the Japanese Diet 
formally ratified the Guidelines Legislation.  Also, amendments revising Japan’s defense 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 55. 
99 Richard B. Finn, “Japan’s Search for a Global Role: Politics and Security”, ed. Warren S. 
Hunsberger, Japan’s Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect, 123-124. 
100 The “Nye Initiative” and its effects are fully covered in Funabashi Yoichi Alliance Adrift, (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 248-276.  
101 The full text of these agreements can be found on the Japanese Defense Agency website [Online] 
at <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.html> [28 August 2002]. 
102 NIDS, East Asian Strategic Review 2000, (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2000), 
121. 
32 
agency establishment law advanced SDF interservice cooperation and crisis response 
capabilities.103  The Diet additionally passed the “Regional Contingency Law” permitting 
JSDF support of U.S. forces in disputes or emergencies near Japan.  As a final point, on 
September 11, 2000, Japan established a “Bilateral Coordination Mechanism” with the United 
States.  This organization set out “to coordinate the activities of the Japanese and U.S. 
governments in the event of an armed attack on Japan and in case of situations in areas 
surrounding Japan.”104  Overall, it is clear from these developments that since the end of the 
Cold War, Japan achieved increased latitude in the use of its military forces while at the same 
time affirming the crucial role of the Japan-U.S. alliance to its overall national defense strategy. 
 
 
2. Japan and September 11 
Dramatic developments in Japan’s military policy transpired in response to the terrorist 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.  First, fearing that Japan might repeat its 
foreign policy mistakes of the Gulf War, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage urged 
Japan to “show the flag” and make “visible forms of participation” in the mounting war on 
terrorism.105  Although his words sparked criticism in the Japanese press, Prime Minister 
Koizumi affirmed Japan’s strong support for the impending American military campaign.  On 
September 19, he unveiled a seven-point plan that aptly demonstrated Japan’s comprehensive 
security philosophy.  The measures included: 106 
 
1. The provision of logistical support for the U.S. military in the case of a retaliatory 
strike 
 
2. Strengthened security around U.S. facilities in Japan 
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3. The dispatch of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships for supply 
and intelligence gathering missions 
 
4. Measures to strengthen international cooperation. 
 
5. Promise to provide SDF assistance to displaced peoples 
 
6. $40 million in emergency humanitarian and economic aid to countries in the region 
including Pakistan and India 
 
7. Cooperation with other governments to ensure there is no confusion in the 
international economy 
 
Koizumi also promised to enact emergency legislation that would allow Japan to take 
these steps.  Following the military response of the United States against Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, on October 29, 2001 the Japanese government enacted 
the “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.”  This law enabled Japan to:107 
contribute actively and on its own initiative to the efforts of the 
international community for the prevention and eradication of 
international terrorism, thereby ensuring the peace and security 
of the international community including Japan itself, through 
such activities as (a) cooperation and support activities for the 
armed forces of the United States and other countries, which 
aim to eradicate the threat of the terrorist attacks, (b) search and 
rescue activities for such foreign forces, and (c) relief activities 
for affected people.  
Shortly after, Japan deployed six MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean in support of the 
U.S.-led coalition.  Additionally, elements of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) began 
assisting the United States in transportation roles in the western Pacific.  On December 7, 2001, 
the Japanese Diet amended the 1992 PKO Law to give JSDF units involved in such operations 
greater flexibility in “monitoring cease-fires, disarming local forces, patrolling demilitarized 
zones, inspecting transport of weapons, and collecting and disposing of abandoned 
weapons.”108  More than any actions previously taken by Japan in the international arena, the 
support given to this effort laid the groundwork for greater Japanese involvement in shaping 
world events. 
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Other notable policy shifts occurred since then.  In April 2002, the Japanese Cabinet 
Japan ratified its “Law to Respond to Armed Attacks” in reaction to the perceived mishandling 
of a December 2001 JMSA interception of a suspected North Korean spy ship.  During the 
intercept, which involved 20 Japanese ships and 14 aircraft, a shootout ensued and the 
suspected ship was sunk.  In March 1999, a similar incident had occurred marking the first 
occasion that the Japanese military had fired shots in anger since 1945.  The new law calls for 
immediate MSDF response to any vessel suspected of being an armed spy ship.  Previously, 
such matters had been the sole responsibility of the JMSA.109  The Koizumi Cabinet also 
forwarded two additional bills to the Diet that included measures to adjust the seating of 
Japan’s Security Council and to provide additional powers to the office of the Prime Minister 
and SDF officers in times of crisis.110  These bills, together with those enacted in the aftermath 
of September 11, represent the most attention Japan has given to military issues in many years. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
The preceding history of Japanese military policy evolution yields many important 
facts.  Among these are trends indicating Japan is moving in the direction of greater military 
flexibility and proactive internationalism.  During the early years of the Cold War, Japan 
focused almost solely on economic growth and recovery while only reluctantly succumbing to 
American pressures to provide for its own defense.  When Japan achieved economic power in 
the 1970s, its military policy became even more connected to the other two pillars of the 
comprehensive security triad: diplomacy and trade.  This forced wider the gap between 
Japanese and American views of the alliance.  Later, Soviet, then Chinese and North Korean 
security threats prompted Japan to assert itself more in the military arena.  These actions 
brought the nation into greater harmony with American global defense strategies and greatly 
strengthened the alliance in the 1990s. 
With the advent of the War on Terrorism, Japan received a momentous opportunity to 
reform its military policy and embark on a renewed path toward becoming a “normal nation.”  
Indeed, the feelings of many Japanese regarding these new directions in their nation’s military 
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policy was captured in the words of Okazaki Hisahiko, a career diplomat and elder statesman, 
who stated: 
Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels are − at long last − 
operating in the Indian Ocean, each flying the Japanese naval 
flag, the Rising Sun… 
…It took fantastically a long period of time, long enough to be 
chronicled at great length, to see this simple thing materialize.  
Looking back, I cannot help but feel chagrined at this country 
for having missed one opportunity after another to send SDF 
troops abroad in the decades after World War II.111 
Conversely, despite the prospect of finally breaking with the past, great opposition still 
exists in Japan concerning any active role for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces abroad.  
Therefore, the thesis turns now to the substance of this current debate over Japan’s future 
military policy. 
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III. JAPAN’S CONTEMPORARY MILITARY POLICY DEBATE 
A. CRITICAL ISSUES 
Japan’s contemporary military policy debate is centered on three key issues: 
constitutional revision (especially Article 9), the right of collective defense, and the use of force 
by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.  Before any future policies can be considered, Japan must 
fully come to grips with each of these issues. 
    
1. Constitutional Revision 
Japan’s current constitution contains numerous obstacles that hinder the nation’s 
successful achievement of its international security interests.112  These obstacles include its 
inability to address social and technological advances as well as the simple fact that it is not a 
“Japanese” constitution, having been originally composed in English and then imperfectly 
translated into Japanese.  The Constitution reflects too many characteristics of a bygone era, 
especially with regard to Japanese military policy. 
Over the years, no issue has provoked more controversy than proposals to revise or 
abolish Article 9.  During the Cold War, these debates centered upon the legitimacy of the Self-
Defense Forces.  On many occasions, the political left opposed the government and proclaimed 
that the very existence of the SDF was unconstitutional.  Moreover, in keeping with Japan’s 
general abhorrence to judicial activism, the Japanese Supreme Court exacerbated matters by 
avoiding the matter altogether.  In the face of great criticism, the Court adopted the stance that 
issues pertaining to the SDF are “a fundamental problem of national administration that has the 
highest political character, so is not a subject for our legal review.”113  Ultra-nationalists were 
equally unnerved by this lassitude.  In November 1970, Japanese society was rocked by the 
spectacular suicide of celebrated author Mishima Yukio.  From a balcony of the Tokyo SDF 
Headquarters, he called for the SDF to execute a “military coup” and to demand revision of the 
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Constitution.  After being jeered and laughed at by crowds of SDF personnel who had gathered 
beneath him, he committed hara-kiri “ritual suicide” in the JDA Director’s office.114 
Today, the JSDF is recognized as a legitimate arm of the government, however the 
limits on its use remain strongly contested.  Since the passage of the 1992 PKO Bill, these 
debates have become increasingly heated.  Thomas Berger described the current situation as 
follows: 115 
Japanese society possesses a “conviction that the armed forces 
are a potential threat to democracy that must be isolated and 
carefully constrained by civilian authorities.  Thus, even when 
one of these safeguards is dropped or altered, it is invariably 
replaced by a new policy whose underlying objective-to 
contain the military-is much the same.  Try as one might, one 
can find no requirement in the laws governing the Self-Defense 
Forces that such an endless succession of brakes be imposed.  
Yet the existence of such practices is itself one of the primary 
handicaps under which Japanese defense planners have to 
labor.  The safeguards are symptoms, not the cause, of Japan’s 
culture of antimilitarism. 
Like a hydra, each time constitutional restrictions are relaxed to permit greater 
flexibility for the SDF, a multitude of new legal limitations are created.  Emergency legislation 
with titles like “peacekeeping cooperation laws” or “special anti-terrorism measures” continues 
to avoid the underlying constitutional dilemma. 
Hopeful prospects for effective constitutional revision began on January 20, 2000.116  
For the first time, the Japanese government established a “Research Commission on the 
Constitution.”  This body has involved members of the Diet in consultations with a broad base 
of Japanese citizens from academics to homemakers.  Although many constitutional issues are 
being addressed, Article 9 has received the most attention.  This has been especially evident 
since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.  Overall, this development 
indicates that concrete steps are being taken to address the constitution’s many problems.  In 
turn, this will empower Japan with greater flexibility in achieving its international security 
interests. 
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2. Collective Defense 
Beyond the broader problems of Article 9, a significant barrier to increased SDF 
activity lies in the Japanese interpretation of collective defense.  The concept of collective 
defense arose in Article 51 of the UN Charter that states:117 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security.  Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect 
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. 
Hence, although the Charter prohibits the use of force to settle disputes, “it endorses the 
use of force by the United Nations and by its members to exercise their inherent right of 
individual or collective defense.”118 
Contrary to this, the Japanese government denies itself the right to collective defense.  
In most military alliances, an attack on one member constitutes an attack on all who are party to 
the alliance.  At the present time, Japan’s only military ally is the United States.  In this 
arrangement, however, Japan’s rejection of collective security means that even if the United 
States is attacked, Japan is not obligated to come to its ally’s defense.  The Japanese 
government’s current official position on this issue is:119  
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It is recognized under international law that a state has the right 
of collective self-defense, which is the right to use actual force 
to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which it has 
close relations, even when that state itself is not under direct 
attack.  It is therefore self-evident that since it is a sovereign 
state, Japan has the right of collective self-defense under 
international law.  The Japanese government nevertheless takes 
the view that the exercise of the right of self-defense as 
authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the 
minimum necessary level for the defense of the country.  The 
government believes that the exercise of the right of collective 
self-defense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore, permissible 
under the Constitution.      
In other words, as stated by Okazaki Hisahiko, “Japan has the right to collective 
defense, but it is a right that Japan will not exercise.”120 
Japan’s rejection of collective self-defense hinders its military relationships with 
foreign countries.  Foremost, this rejection places it in violation of 1995 UN “Guidelines on 
Peacekeeping Operations” that declare participants in PKO must come to each other’s 
defense.121  Furthermore, this situation has produced numerous scenarios that call into question 
how far Japan will take this rejection of collective defense.122  For example, under the current 
view, a ballistic missile launched from the Asian mainland toward the United States could not 
be engaged by Japanese air defense systems even if they were the only assets capable of 
intercepting it.  Such scenarios work against Japanese involvement in multinational coalitions 
since other nations’ militaries are reluctant to depend upon Japanese forces for their common 
defense.  
As a final point, the issue of collective self-defense is currently under intense scrutiny 
in the Japanese government.123  Immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
NATO invoked its commitment to collective self-defense for the first time in its history.  Great 
Britain, Italy, Turkey, and Germany all offered the United States military support under this 
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resolution, while Japan could not do likewise.  This development spurred increased discussion 
over the issue of collective defense in the Japanese government. 
 
3. Use of Force 
Under its constitutional restraints, the JSDF is severely restricted in its use of force.  
Current PKO legislation directs that SDF personnel may only use weapons for “minimum self-
defense purposes.”124  This causes further difficulties when combined with stringent rules of 
engagement.  Anticipatory self-defense has also been an extremely divisive subject, especially 
after North Korean missile tests and in reference to possible North Korean development of 
weapons of mass destruction.  Finally, Japanese policy prohibits it from being an “integral part 
of the use of force” by other nations.125  This means that Japan may not provide weapons, 
ammunition, or other war materiel to any units currently involved in or intending to participate 
in combat.  The debate is still ongoing whether or not this prohibition applies to the fueling of 
U.S. warships in a rear area as occurred in the initial stages of operations in Afghanistan in late 
2001. 
Overall, these three critical issues present a considerable conundrum to Japanese 
military policy makers.  Much evidence supports Berger’s conclusion that: 126 
Japan’s unwillingness or inability to respond to military 
security threats is much greater than is assumed by those who 
believe that their behavior is merely the consequence of the free 
ride on security [it] receives from the United States.  This, of 
course, makes the problem of achieving an equitable sharing of 
the burden of international security far more intractable. 
 
B. JAPAN IN 2002 
1. Political Situation 
Substantial political reorganization occurred between 1989 and 2002 with prospects to 
continue into the future.127  Foremost, the death of Emperor Hirohito on January 7, 1989 
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marked the passing of the Showa era and the demise of one of the last remaining symbols of 
the World War Two period.  The ascendancy of Akihito to the throne the following year 
witnessed Japan’s entry into the Heisei era, or “Achieving Peace.”  Vigorous, liberal-minded, 
and western-educated, Akihito gained attention for his open interaction with the Japanese 
people and his rebelliousness against restrictions imposed upon him by the Kunaicho (Imperial 
Household Agency).  He represented a breath of fresh air to many Japanese.128 
In 1993, the relatively unchallenged rule of the LDP ended after 38 years with the 
election of Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro.  To a great extent, this occurred due to 
electoral reforms that expanded the ability of rival parties to gain seats in the Diet.  Subsequent 
frequent shifts in government control caused many to believe that either Japan was truly 
becoming a multiparty democracy or that it would fall into the Italian habit of “revolving door” 
governments unable to act before they were replaced.129  Also during this time, women began 
to hold unprecedented positions of authority in society and the government.  The current 
National Diet shows women controlling nearly 16 percent of the seats in the House of 
Representatives and seven percent in the House of Councilors.130 
Another important characteristic of this period was the rise in Japan of the “new right.”  
These nationalists called for rearming Japan, abolishing or modifying the U.S. security treaty, 
and enabling Japan to become a “normal” country once more.  Criticisms of Japan’s 
dependence on the United States for protection caused some Japanese commentators to exclaim 
that, “putting political pressure on Japan [is] like twisting the arm of a baby.”131 
Owing to tremendous political infighting, Japan’s government has largely been unable 
to effectively address foreign policy and military issues.132  In 2002, the current government is 
confronted by a gridlock of competing political factors.  Among these are party interests, public 
pressures, excessive bureaucratic power, and the problematic nature of Japanese consensus-
based decision making. 
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a. Party Interests 
Despite its relative loss of power, the LDP remains the most influential and 
popular political party in Japan.133  The LDP is largely non-ideological and, unlike American 
political parties, is divided by a number of competing factions.  As the former guardians of the 
“1955 system,” the LDP tends to be politically conservative in its outlook.  LDP politicians 
continue to be closely connected to business interests that support their campaigns and expect 
legislative compensation in return.  In recent years, however, economic problems in Japan 
limited the LDP from dispensing such boons causing a decline in its power.134  The Japanese 
people traditionally tolerated this system of graft within the LDP as being a necessary function 
of politics and as long as local districts benefited from the national “pork” it produced.  
However, recent scandals within the LDP demonstrated that many of its politicians were 
abusing their positions for personal financial aggrandizement.  Public uproar against these 
scandals has weakened the popular support for the LDP in recent elections.135  In general, the 
LDP receives its greatest support from heavy industry and Japan’s agricultural and construction 
sectors. 
 The LDP is split in its opinions concerning SDF involvement in overseas 
military actions.136  Former LDP Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi stridently opposed SDF 
dispatch during the Gulf War even if commissioned by the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC).  Others, including Koizumi, have proposed constitutional changes to Japan’s military 
policy.  In his initial political campaign, Koizumi expressed wariness of Japan actually 
achieving a permanent seat on UN Security Council owing to the military responsibilities it 
might entail.  Later, however, he called for constitutional revision and that the SDF be properly 
called a military.137  Still other major LDP leaders, such as Ozawa Ichiro, left the LDP 
altogether to form new parties that better express their different conservative perspectives.  As 
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of August 2002, the LDP held 50.5 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives (Lower 
House) and 47 percent in the House of Councilors (Upper House).138  
The primary opposition party to the LDP is the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ).  The DPJ rose in power in 1998 by absorbing the members of a variety of smaller 
parties.  These included the New Frontier Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic 
Socialist Party, the Harbinger Party, and the Japan New Party.139  On the whole, the DPJ 
represents those disaffected with LDP leadership but who also do not adhere to radical political 
philosophies.  Kan Naoto, the party’s first leader, attempted to define the DPJ’s beliefs as 
encouraging government “decentralization, independence from the bureaucracy, and 
transparency.”140Although such statements demonstrate an amorphous ideology like the LDP, 
its platforms tend to be more politically left of center.  Various industrial and trade worker 
groups as well as middle class women and urban salarymen support the DPJ.141 
The DPJ is divided in its views on how the SDF should be used internationally.  
Common themes include improving Japan’s position in its dealings with the United States, 
adopting a UN-centered foreign policy, and emphasizing multilateral rather than autonomous 
security.  Some have stressed “exclusively defense-oriented military doctrine” with use of the 
SDF governed by Diet passage of “emergency legislation.”142  On the other hand, Yamada 
Toshimasa of the DPJ and Club of Independents recently declared, “our international 
cooperation will never be recognized as such overseas if we take the position that we cannot 
use armed forces because of constitutional restrictions.”143  The DPJ currently holds 26 percent 
of the seats in the House of Representatives and 24 percent in the House of Councilors. 
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The third largest political party in Japan is the New Komeito Party, or “Clean 
Government Party” (CGP).  Also known simply as “the Komeito,” the CGP is the only major 
political party in Japan with a strongly religious ideology.  The CGP receives its support from 
the Buddhist sect Sokagakkai, a contemporary offshoot of traditional Japanese nichiren 
Buddhism.  CGP power increased greatly in the 1990s by aggressively proselytizing the public 
with its message of “fusing Buddhism with politics.”144  This philosophy calls for ending 
government corruption, improving social welfare programs, and refocusing youth on traditional 
Japanese values.  The party generally represents the dissatisfied and socially alienated in Japan 
including small shopkeepers, women, young people, unskilled workers, and those with limited 
education. 
The CGP takes a better-defined stance on military issues than the LDP or the 
DPJ.145  In keeping with its Buddhist philosophy, the CGP emphasizes pacifism, Asian 
multilateralism, nuclear disarmament, and the role of “soft power” in foreign policy.146  
However, its humanist doctrine also makes the CGP a strong supporter of Japanese 
involvement in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts.  These beliefs came to 
light during an August 27, 2002 confrontation between CGP General Secretary Fuyushiba 
Tetsuzo and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.  In a frank discussion on the 
topic of Japan’s support for a potential American attack on Iraq, Fuyushiba all but characterized 
Armitage as bloodthirsty stating, “you should absolutely refrain from killing innocent 
people…violence by any country should be brought to an end in the name of the international 
community through procedures as provided by [UN Charter] Article 39."147  Overall, the CGP 
is opposed to the SDF becoming involved in a combat role but is very supportive of its use in 
non-combat missions.  At present, the CGP controls 10 percent of the seats in the House of 
Representatives and 6.5 percent in the House of Councilors. 
The Japan Communist Party (JCP) is the oldest and most well defined 
ideological party in Japan.  Founded in 1922, the JCP enjoyed close connections to Moscow 
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and Beijing for most of its history.  In the 1990s, however, the JCP shifted its ideological base 
from the Chinese model to an Italian style that better reflected its nationalist orientation.148  
Over the years, the power of the JCP waxed and waned and today holds little attraction for 
most Japanese.  To little effect, the JCP has attempted to raise public support by advocating 
world peace, denouncing the Japan-U.S. alliance and calling for the return of the Northern 
Territories from Russia in addition to its traditional demands for workers’ rights.  The JCP 
draws its support from radical students, intellectuals, and members of the peace movement. 
The JCP holds strong antimilitary views regarding the SDF and its potential 
international role.  It opposes any alteration to current constitutional restrictions on SDF activity 
and it was only in 2000 that the JCP even acknowledged the legality of the SDF’s existence.  
The JCP has long been a critic and antagonist of LDP military policies, especially those that 
have brought Japan closer to the United States.  Even in the aftermath of September 11, the JCP 
stridently opposed military action in Afghanistan with JCP leader Haruna Naoaki saying, 
“Japan should only make a non-military contribution” toward the war on terrorism.149  The 
JCP holds 4 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and 8 percent in the House of 
Councilors. 
In 1998 Ozawa Ichiro formed the Liberal Party from members of his Japan 
Renewal Party that split from the LDP in 1993.  The Liberal Party is highly conservative and 
possesses an articulate ideological platform that is second only to the JCP in its cohesion.150  Its 
strength comes from its proactive philosophy that has drawn support from the LDP’s political 
right. 
The Liberal Party champions Ozawa’s vision of Japan as a “normal nation” and 
concentrates on foreign policy and defense issues over domestic affairs.  Its adherents call for 
constitutional revision, active and expanded SDF participation in UN PKO, and freedom for 
the SDF to use force under UN collective security guidelines.  The Liberal Party’s statement 
regarding the terrorist attacks on the United States reflects their view: 
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The acts of terror that occurred in the United States are an 
affront to the ideals of freedom and democracy.  We must 
respond resolutely to the terrorist threat.  In particular, our 
country, which has in the past lacked resolve in the face of 
terrorist demands, needs to react with a new awareness and 
determination.  However, the response of the current 
administration does not indicate that any decision has been 
made regarding the interpretation of the constitution in such 
circumstances.  The steps proposed by Prime Minister 
Koizumi are nothing more than ad hoc, spur-of-the-moment 
half-measures.  Such irresponsible politics endanger Japan 
and expose the Japanese people to an uncertain future.  Our 
country must hasten to establish fundamental principles and 
structures in the areas of both national security and crisis 
management.151  
The Liberal Party holds 4.6 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives 
and 3.2 percent in the House of Councilors. 
The last major Japanese political party is the Social Democratic Party (SDP).  
The SDP serves as the final remains of the previously strong Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which 
shattered in the 1990s after forming coalition governments with the LDP.  For many years, the 
JSP acted as the strongest and most credible leftist opposition party in Japanese politics.  The 
JSP’s collusion with its previous political opponents destroyed the faith of its supporters, 
largely labor unions and working-class organizations.  As a result, the DPJ absorbed many of 
these disaffected supporters and the Social Democratic Party’s influence has been 
marginalized. 
Like the JCP, the Social Democratic Party resists any increase in SDF activity 
and only recently even acquiesced to its legality.  The most actively pacifistic members of the 
SDP promote the idea that Japan should utilize non-violent means of resistance in the event of a 
national emergency.  This is reflected in SDP leader Oshima Reiko’s statement to the Diet that 
the position of the SDP is to “pursue disarmament and reduce the size of the SDF while 
recognizing its existence.”152  Internationally, the SDP favors humanitarian assistance only.  
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The SDP presently holds nearly 4 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and 3 
percent in the House of Councilors. 
 
b. Public Pressures 
The fractious nature of Japanese politics echoes comparable divisions within 
the Japanese public concerning national military policies.  Japan’s government is sensitive to 
public opinion and takes seriously the results of countless polls conducted by its media and 
think tanks.  Furthermore, a cultural trait of Japanese society is its emphasis on belonging to 
social groups.153  Many Japanese voice their political concerns through their membership in 
interest-oriented organizations rather than speaking out individually.  Since the passage of the 
PKO bill in 1992, opinion polls have consistently confirmed Japanese public support for SDF 
involvement in UN PKO.154  Even so, they remain sharply divided as to how this involvement 
should be executed. 
Organized opposition to active SDF involvement comes mainly from groups 
that embrace leftist political ideologies, namely student groups, labor unions, and some press 
institutions.  One of the most vocal student groups is the Zengakuren, the “All-Japan Students 
Self-Governing Association”, which has close connections to the JCP and has long advocated 
the end of the Japan-U.S. treaty, the removal of American military forces from Japan, and 
decreased American military activity around the world.155  This group is exceptional, however, 
and since the late 1960s such student activism has declined greatly.  Most college-age Japanese 
are as politically apathetic as their counterparts throughout the world.  Labor unions also often 
oppose SDF activity.  One noteworthy example is Sohyo, “All-Japan Federation of Labor,” that 
is composed of teachers, communications workers, and transportation workers.  Sohyo was 
historically tied to the former JSP.156  Even workers in defense industry unions express their 
anxiety over SDF activity by not actively pressuring the JDA on matters of procurement that 
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would benefit their own livelihood.157  Overall, labor unions hold little political power apart 
from their financial support of left-wing politicians.158  Finally, within the national press 
organizations, the daily newspapers Asahi Shimbun and the Mainichi Shimbun continue to 
remain critical of SDF activity and any proposals to modify national military policy.159 
More broadly, the peace movement and religious organizations also oppose 
active SDF involvement overseas.  The Japanese peace movement draws supporters from all 
walks of life and is usually concerned with nuclear disarmament.  Since the end of the Cold 
War, their strength has diminished considerably.  Religious organizations also espouse pacifism 
on spiritual grounds.  The disestablishment of state Shinto during the American occupation 
enabled many formerly lower profile Buddhist sects to reorganize and build followings.  As a 
rule, however, Japanese pacifism is humanistic and lacks a religious foundation other than 
generalized Buddhist principles.  Most Japanese today are secular, with Shinto and Buddhist 
influences found more in culture and art than in politics.160  As has been previously noted, the 
Komeito is a unique exception. 
On the other end of the spectrum stand a wide variety of organizations that 
support the active use of the SDF in overseas activities.  The most prominent are numerous 
local SDF “support groups.”  In 1993, Katzenstein and Okawara reported that these voluntary 
associations, SDF support groups, and other civic organizations mustered over 10 million 
members.  Many members are politically conservative, although the majority seek to lobby the 
government on local issues concerning nearby base operations and other funding matters.161  
Within the Japanese press, the newspapers Sankei Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, and the Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun generally support military activities.162  One example of this occurred in late 
1994 when the Yomiuri Shimbun published an alternative constitution that declared the legality 
of the armed forces and empowered them with the ability to fully meet Japan’s international 
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security requirements.163  Lastly, a number of ultra-nationalist groups such as the Nihon 
Aikokuto (Japan Patriotic Party), “Black Dragons,” and the “Japan Youth Federation” also 
advocate for a greatly expanded SDF role in Japan.  On the whole, however, these associations 
do more harm than good for their cause owing to their connections to yakuza organized crime 
interests and their virulent rhetoric that often calls for the restoration of the Imperial system and 
the expulsion of foreigners. 
  
c. Bureaucratic Interests  
The power of the bureaucracy within Japan’s government compounds the 
problems it faces regarding military policy.  Under the “1955 system,” the composition of the 
bureaucracy remained relatively imperious to outside political change.  In recent years, 
however, shifts in the makeup of the Diet and the Prime Minister’s office have increasingly 
affected its structure and power.164  As a result, party fragmentation and divisive public opinion 
“weaken the ability of the government to act decisively… leaving most power to be exercised 
by the bureaucracy.”165  One notable example of this excessive power is the fact that the 
Japanese bureaucracy controls about half of total government revenues free of restrictions or 
accountability to the Diet.166 
Such influence traditionally lessened the importance of military policy.  In 
keeping with the concept of comprehensive security, military policy was only one small leg of 
the military policy tripod.  Foremost were economic considerations, followed by diplomatic, 
and then military matters.  This hierarchy reflected the standing of the relevant ministries within 
the government bureaucracy.  When the government faced an issue of economic security, the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)167 took precedence, followed by the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).  However, when an 
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issue of military security arose, a similar chain of command formed, led by the MOF, MOFA, 
and then lastly the JDA in order of importance.168 
Clearly, this demonstrates the JDA’s lack of stature among the other 
ministries.169  The head of the JDA has always been a “director” rather than a full-fledged 
“minister.”  In addition, the JDA is usually required to fill a large number of its job vacancies 
with members of other ministries rather than by promoting from within.  On the surface, this 
state of affairs represented the continued mistrust of the military by civilian authorities.  As a 
result, the expertise of individuals familiar with military matters was typically not given free 
expression within the policy-making functions of the government. 
During the 1990s, the status of the JDA improved.  In 1997, many junior LDP 
politicians pushed for the Agency to be elevated to full Ministry status, a move welcomed by 
junior JDA bureaucrats.  Surprisingly, the wariness and conservatism of senior JDA officials 
halted the reform plan.170  Today, although it remains limited in its policy-making role, JDA 
influence is increasingly felt in foreign affairs decision-making.  Michael Green ascribes this 
change to four factors:171 
1. SDF contributions to UN PKO make high-visibility contributions to Japanese 
diplomatic efforts. 
 
2. The JDA now acts as a primary conduit for managing alliance affairs with the 
United States. 
 
3. Growing public awareness of threats to Japan’s national security including regional 
missile tests and terrorist acts. 
 
4. Increased technical expertise and information concerning military issues now 
exceeds that possessed by rival Ministries. 
 
Overall, bureaucratic politics will continue to present challenges to the 
Japanese government in constructing an effective military policy.            
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d. Decision-Making 
The Japanese decision-making process also influences the development of 
military policy.  There are over 126 million Japanese living in a total land area less than the size 
of Texas.  Over the centuries, these crowded conditions created a cultural preference for 
consensus-based decision-making in which all affected parties are given a chance to voice their 
concerns.172  Directives and mandates from one individual are usually balked at.  Henry 
Kissinger characterized this system saying, “A Japanese Prime Minister is the custodian of 
national consensus, not the creator of it.”173  Kissinger goes on to say that this has been a major 
frustration of foreign leaders, especially the United States, when dealing with Japan.  Adding to 
these problems is the Japanese tendency to preserve former leaders in unofficial roles such as 
“kingmaker” for their political parties.  This “man behind the curtain” conservatism slows the 
introduction of new ideas into the political sphere.  On the whole, the entire process is 
extraordinarily lengthy.  Often, in the absence of an agreed upon consensus, Japanese leaders 
find it easier to make no decision at all.  Such patterns reflect “a philosophy that if no decision 
is made, no one can be accused of doing anything wrong.”174 
Accordingly, given the previously demonstrated political divisiveness of 
military matters, consensus-based decisions on military policy are extremely difficult to arrive 
at.  One attempt at an internal solution that arose during the 1980s was the development of 
various zoku, or “tribes” within the government.175  The zoku lobby for their ministry’s 
interests by forming policy caucuses in the Diet.  Initially, the defense zoku lacked the influence 
or backing possessed by other special interests such as the construction industry, agriculture, 
and trade.  As a result, they often “solicited U.S. pressure on Japan to increase defense 
spending.”176  Since the political shakeups of 1993, the defense zoku have enjoyed greater 
success.  They played a key role in the construction of the 1996 U.S-Japan Defense Guidelines 
and, in combination with foreign policy zoku, they fought for indigenous intelligence satellite 
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capability in 1998.  Overall, however, these initiatives demonstrated the energy of the junior 
politicians involved rather than sweeping changes to how military policy decisions are handled 
by the government.177 
On the other hand, gaiatsu − foreign pressure − has proven to be effective in 
forcing through changes to Japan’s military policy in the past, particularly by the United States.  
According to Hunsberger, “Without strong pressure from abroad, the Japanese consensus 
society has only limited capacity to make difficult choices or embark on new courses that 
involve painful change and disruption.”178  He goes further to say that Japan has not 
demonstrated great leadership in the past and, rather than write the rules of international 
society, prefers to succeed within the systems set up by others.  Despite its effectiveness, 
gaiatsu carries with it a high cost in political capital.  It also often damages the prestige of the 
Japanese government with its constituents.   
 
2. Economic Situation 
Japan’s economy is beset by troubles and faces a highly uncertain future.  Given the 
Japanese government’s long-standing focus on economic security over military security, this 
situation portends further difficulties toward effectively developing future national military 
policies. 
The creation of a favorable economic environment, both at home and abroad, has 
always been a vital Japanese national interest.179  Domestically, the pursuit of this interest 
encouraged the formation of strong bonds between Japan’s government, industry, and financial 
institutions.  Japan’s economy benefited from its ability to direct government revenues toward 
investment in national infrastructure while devoting relatively minimal amounts to defense 
programs.  Internationally, Japanese economic policies encouraged a high overseas demand for 
Japanese products.  At the same time, Japan attempted to reduce foreign anxiety over the 
success of its exports through a wide range of investment and developmental assistance 
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devices.  Taken as a whole, Japan continues to follow a more regulated, directed, and unified 
economic strategy than many other advanced democracies. 
After four decades of phenomenal growth, Japan’s “bubble economy” burst in 1990.  
By 1993-1994, the country had entered its worst recession since 1945.180  Later, in 1997, the 
collapse of the Thai baht produced a widespread Asian economic crisis that Japanese leadership 
proved ineffectual in combating.  Many nations became concerned that Japan was impotent in 
influencing Asian economic affairs.181  Today, Japan’s government debt exceeds its GDP in 
estimates ranging from 130 percent to 400 percent and its banks hold as much as $2 trillion in 
non-performing loans.182  Japanese unemployment stands at a remarkable five percent.  The 
government has tried to revitalize the economy through a variety of “stimulus packages” to 
little effect.  Even Prime Minister Koizumi’s ambitious restructuring and reform proposals have 
been inadequate to cope with these problems.183 
Thus, Japan faces a future of difficult economic choices.  In a recent Foreign Affairs 
article titled “Japan’s Economy, at War With Itself,” economist William Overholt stated that 
Japan continues to possess an economy constructed along the wartime model of 1940, one that 
is very unsuited for the conditions of the 21st century.184  He warned that if Japan continues to 
postpone fixing its economic problems, it could become engulfed in a crisis similar to “Weimar 
Germany.”185  Japanese economist Shimada Haruo echoes these woes and adds that 
globalization has added to Japan’s economic miseries through the relocation of many industries 
from the high-cost environment of Japan to less expensive countries such as China.186  
Additionally, many Japanese believe that the nation will suffer economically in coming years 
owing to the nation’s low birth rate and the increasingly higher costs of supporting an aging 
population.187 
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All of the news is not bad, however.  On the positive side, Japan is the world’s third 
largest producer of manufactured goods (after the United States and Germany).  The products 
of its high-tech and automobile industries continue to be in high demand throughout the 
world.188  If completed in a timely and efficient manner, reorganization and streamlining will 
preserve Japan’s substantial economic power for a long time into the future.189 
The importance of economic issues gives civilian industries considerable influence 
over Japanese military policy.  On a broad scale, civilian industrial, business, and financial 
institutions remain tightly interconnected through the keiretsu system.  These networks possess 
vast resources used to lobby members of the government.  Primary keiretsu conglomerates 
include Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa, which control roughly a fourth 
of all economic activity in Japan.190  Furthermore, nearly all large Japanese businesses, or 
zakai, belong to three influential organizations: Keidanren (the Federation of Economic 
Organizations), Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives), and Nihon 
Shoko Kaigisho (Japan Chamber of Commerce).191  Beyond their commercial usefulness, 
these associations serve as an outlet for zakai to express their political views concerning 
Japanese foreign and military policy.  Keidanren is the largest and most influential organization 
of the three and is intimately involved in foreign and military policy formulation.  The Keizai 
Doyukai, while divided in its views on military policy, has called for greater debate on 
Japanese military issues, especially expanding SDF participation in PKO as well as 
constitutional revision.192 
Although civilian and defense industries are inextricably linked together in Japan, 
emphasis on defense production is low.  The Japanese defense industry comprises only 0.6 
percent of national industrial production and employs only approximately 60,000 workers.193  
Even within Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Japan’s largest defense contractor, defense-related 
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sales only comprised 15 percent of its overall earnings during the 1990s.194  Similar ratios are 
found throughout the Japanese defense industry.  The main reason for this can be found in 
Japan’s policy not to export arms.  Although Japan indigenously produces approximately 80 
percent of its defense material and weaponry, the inability to export arms makes production 
lines short and very costly.  Japan contracts the remainder of it armament needs from the 
United States and Europe.  Defense industrialists have grumbled at these ratios but acquiesce to 
the political expediency of the arrangement.195  Other reasons for limiting allocations to 
defense production include numerous recent procurement scandals, corporate restructuring, and 
a continued reliance on licensing designs from other countries, especially the United States.196 
The main interest of Japanese industry, like those in any country, is profit.  This more 
than anything affects its stance on national military policy.  One solution that is frequently 
utilized is the production of “dual-use” technologies.  These are products not specifically built 
for military use but which can easily be adapted to military needs.  Vehicles, computers, and 
many other items fit this category.  Such dual-use products have become so diffused 
throughout Japanese industry that nearly all of the major keiretsu can be said to have a vital 
interest in defense budgets.197  Dual-use also permits convenient political deniability of an 
industry’s involvement in defense production.  This reflects a continued sensitivity to public 
opinion and antimilitarist sentiment.198 
In sum, Japanese economic interests possess considerable influence over national 
military policy.  Their purpose is to profit from the creation of stable domestic and international 
markets.  They have a vested interest in the defense budget owing to dual-use production, but 
do not rely heavily on such contracts for their livelihood.  They view changes to Japan’s 
military policy in terms of how it might affect the “bottom line,” at home and abroad. 
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3. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces 
A full appreciation of Japan’s current debate requires an examination of SDF 
capabilities, limitations, suitability for coalition operations, and its influence over military 
policy-making.199  Since its official establishment in 1954, the SDF, Jieitai, has steadily 
improved its strength and capabilities despite great social and institutional resistance.  The SDF 
musters a total strength of 235,300 volunteer personnel divided into three services: Kaijo, the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), Kuko, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), and Rikujo, 
the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF).200  All three services are vigorously pursuing 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies in addition to improving structural C4I 
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence) capabilities.  Echoing 
developments in the United States military, the SDF is struggling to improve joint operations 
between its separate branches. 
In keeping with principles of upholding civilian control, the SDF chain-of-command 
system limits its flexibility.  The leaders of each service branch comprise a Joint Staff Council 
headed by the senior SDF officer.  The chief of the Joint Staff Council reports to the JDA 
director general, not to the prime minister who is the nominal commander-in-chief.  At this 
level, civilian political authorities closely control SDF operations through a multitude of legal 
mechanisms.  The JDA Director is the only military representative on the prime minister’s 
Security Council.  The heads of other government ministries, including the Ministries of Trade 
and Finance, fill the remaining seats.  In addition, the prime minister is required to secure Diet 
approval through a lengthy process prior to executing most military orders.  In total, this system 
hinders effective command of the SDF, especially in times of crisis. 
Throughout its history, the JSDF has been held in low regard by Japanese society at 
large.  This was particularly true from the 1950s to the 1970s.  Pay and benefits of SDF 
members did not favorably compare with those available in civilian industry and widespread 
student protests prevented SDF officers from pursuing graduate studies at big universities like 
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Tokyo University.201  Moreover, military-related research and development was neglected in 
favor of purchases of technology from the United States.202  Although the social status and 
personnel benefits of SDF members has improved somewhat in recent years, recruitment and 
retention remain a problem, especially within the officer ranks.203 
 
a. Capabilities 
Arguably the most capable service branch is the MSDF.  The MSDF is 
comprised of 42,600 personnel who man the ships and aircraft of the third largest navy in the 
world.204  Naval assets include forty-one destroyers, eighteen submarines, twelve frigates, three 
missile-armed hydrofoils, and over thirty minesweepers.  Of the forty-one destroyers, four are 
of the Kongou-class, which is equipped with the premier AEGIS combat system.  In keeping 
with Japan’s declared defensively oriented posture, MSDF warships do not possess a land-
attack capability beyond short-range gun systems.  On the other hand, these ships are equipped 
with the best anti-air and anti-ship missile systems available.  There are no naval infantry in the 
MSDF force structure; however, in March 2001 Japan created a special tactics unit similar to 
the U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land Teams (SEALS).  This new unit appears to be specifically 
designed for dealing with the capture of vessels intruding in Japan’s territorial waters.205  Due 
to its seagoing nature, the MSDF has not participated in any UN peacekeeping operations.  
Instead, the MSDF continues to focus on traditional naval missions of sea control through 
extensive training in local waters. 
Recent developments within the MSDF indicate promising future potential.206  
The MSDF dedicates a substantial portion of its training regimen to anti-submarine warfare and 
mine warfare.  In addition, the MSDF is extensively involved in Theater Ballistic Missile 
Defense (TBMD) research and development and sees this as a primary mission for the future.  
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Various designs of “light aircraft carriers” have been proposed during the 1990s that would 
carry small numbers of helicopters or fighter aircraft.  This is hoped to extend the MSDF 
operational reach at sea.  Also, proposals have been approved for construction of a large 
logistical ship to act in replenishing overseas GSDF deployed units.  MSDF forces have been 
highly visible in the war on terrorism including convoy of the U.S. aircraft carrier Kittyhawk in 
September 2001, and refueling and intelligence gathering duties in the Indian Ocean. 
Another critical element of the Japanese military is the ASDF.207  
Approximately 44,200 personnel serve in the ASDF at a variety of airbases throughout Japan.  
The ASDF controls over 800 aircraft of which approximately 300 are multi-role fighters and 
interceptors.  Among these combat aircraft are over 150 F-15J’s, indigenously produced and 
highly capable interceptors.  The ASDF is charged with defending the airspace over and around 
Japan and therefore also controls over 500 land-based surface-to-air missile systems. 
The ASDF is beginning to assume a more active role in overall SDF 
operations.  For many years, the ASDF conducted its mission in relative isolation from its sister 
services.  During the 1990s, however, ASDF C-130 transport aircraft were used extensively to 
resupply and airlift personnel in Zaire and Rwanda during Japanese PKO.  These same aircraft 
were used most recently for transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to Pakistan in 
November 2001.  The ASDF also developed a new fighter aircraft designated the F-2A/B (also 
known as FS-X).  At present, technical difficulties with the fighter’s radar system have 
prevented it being fielded.  Finally, in December 2000, the ASDF appropriated funding for four 
new tanker aircraft to permit in-air refueling of fighter aircraft to extend their operational range. 
The GSDF is the largest component of the Japanese military.208  It comprises 
148,500 personnel divided into five geographically oriented armies.  The GSDF inventory 
includes over 1000 main battle tanks, 790 armored personnel carriers, over 900 heavy artillery 
pieces and wide range of anti-tank and air defense weapons.  Notable in this order of battle are 
150 highly regarded and indigenously developed Type-90 main battle tanks.  GSDF doctrine is 
focused on defense of the Japanese home islands from potential Chinese or Russian invasion.  
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No offensive operational or tactical training occurs.  The GSDF has long emphasized disaster 
relief operations, although it received great criticism in the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe 
earthquake that caused 6336 deaths and injured nearly 35,000.  Because of confusing chains of 
command and organization, it took the GSDF 14 hours to respond to the disaster.209  Overall, 
the GSDF is admirably equipped but suffers shortcomings in training and organization. 
Despite its problems, the GSDF has been the most active service in overseas 
operations in recent years.  GSDF deployed to Cambodia, Rwanda, Mozambique, and the 
Golan Heights during the 1990s.  In March 2002, Japan dispatched a 680-man GSDF civil 
engineering battalion to East Timor in support of UNTAET (United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor).  Since the passage of the 1992 PKO Act, Japan has vigorously 
worked to restructure its ground forces into smaller and more easily deployable brigades and 
divisions.  Training has emphasized hostile environment survivability, foreign language and 
area instruction, as well as emphasizing disaster relief and other aspects of “military operations 
other than war” (MOOTW). 
Beyond the three formal services of the SDF, Japan also possesses a diverse 
array of other national security assets.  Separate from the official SDF stands the Japanese 
Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA).  The JMSA is Japan’s Coast Guard and possesses over 517 
ships and 70 aircraft that fulfill a wide range of coastal security functions.  Japan also has a 
vigorous space program and has recently indicated its intention to expand its limited spaced-
based intelligence collection capability.  In 1997, Japan created a new “Defense Intelligence 
Headquarters” that unified various functions and established bilateral links with other Asian 
countries.  These developments are a break from Japan’s traditionally heavy reliance upon on 
American information sharing.210  Japan’s “three non-nuclear principles” and its signing of the 
1970 United Nations Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibit its possession of nuclear weapons.  In 
addition, Japan’s defensive posture prevents it from deploying ballistic missiles.  Despite these 
restraints, Japan possesses a robust domestic nuclear power program that, if combined with 
indigenous space technologies, could easily translate into Japan becoming a nuclear power if it 
so desired.  This fact, rarely spoken of openly, serves as an implicit nuclear deterrent for Japan. 
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b. Suitability for Coalition Operations 
At the present time, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are poorly suited for 
coalition operations.  This is due to a number of factors: 
1. The SDF has absolutely no combat experience. 
 
2. Japan’s rejection of the principle of collective security and its extreme restrictions 
on use of force make the SDF appear undependable to allies in the face of hostile 
action.211 
 
3. Even in training exercises, the SDF is extremely resistant to receiving orders from 
foreign commanders.  This unwillingness arises from a confused linguistic 
interpretation of “command” given by the Japanese government.  A foreign 
commander may “command”, (shizu) a JSDF commander, but only the Japanese 
Commander-in-Chief (the Prime Minister) may “direct”, (shiki) the commander.  
Given that most modern militaries reject such confused terminology under the 
concept of “one battlefield, one commander” this predilection hampers JSDF 
participation in multinational military organizations.212 
 
4. SDF officers “rarely go abroad for training and, consequently, there is little need to 
learn foreign languages, a situation which may hamper…fully integrated UN 
missions.”213 
 
5. Although Japan frequently conducts bilateral exercises with the United States, the 
SDF “has never participated in any multilateral training in anticipation of a 
conflict.”214  This is especially true of the ASDF and the GSDF.  Traditionally, 
exercises are politically toned down so as not to provoke domestic or international 
accusations that the SDF is being overly aggressive or militaristic. 
 
6. The SDF has been historically under funded in the areas of logistics and operations.  
In 1994, Wilborn wrote “few troops are able to practice with live ammunition once 
a year.”215  Such inadequate funding in combination with overemphasis on disaster 
relief missions limits SDF combat readiness. 
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A 1998 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment poignantly summarized these 
difficulties.  The assessment offered discouraging prospects for Japan’s future contribution to 
coalition warfare stating: 216 
The actual efficiency of…Japanese arms…remains to be seen, 
as it is doubtful if any Japanese weapons have actually been 
used in combat since the end of World War Two.  Similarly, it 
is unclear how well the un-blooded JSDF would perform in an 
actual confrontation, although it is apparent that modern Japan 
retains elements of an underlying martial tradition.  That said, 
Japan's involvement with international peacekeeping has yet to 
involve any serious setbacks. Large-scale casualties (e.g. 
caused by the sinking of a ship or a major terrorist bombing), 
sustained casualties (e.g. resulting from persistent sniping, 
mines, boobytraps, etc.), or a major scandal of the type 
Canadian and Italian peacekeeping troops have faced resulting 
from the abuse of indigenous people, could greatly lessen the 
Japanese public's support for such operations.  Clearly, 
significant, but achievable, doctrinal, logistical and equipment 
upgrades would be necessary for the JSDF to conduct 
independent operations, particularly joint-arms power 
projection operations. 
 
Alternatively, positive prospects exist for the suitability of the SDF in the 
future.  Japan has made substantial improvements in SDF training and operations in recent 
years indicating its awareness of its shortcomings and a desire to overcome them.  Peter 
Woolley notes that despite its lack of combat experience, the SDF has frequently engaged in 
what the American military categorizes as MOOTW.217  Of sixteen broadly defined categories 
of MOOTW, the JSDF has actually performed ten of these missions including: arms control, 
combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil 
authorities, nation assistance, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, and 
show of force. 
Of the six remaining types, Japan is easily capable of participating in four more 
under its current constitutional restrictions.  These are enforcement of economic sanctions, 
enforcement of exclusion zones, ensurance of freedom of navigation and overflight, and non-
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combatant evacuation operations.  Only two MOOTW are presently impossible for Japan to 
perform legally: strikes and raids and direct support to insurgencies.  Since most military 
analysts believe that MOOTW represents the future nature of conflict resolution, it can be said 
that the SDF is already moving in the right direction rather than focusing on huge WWII-style 
operations. 
Other positive indicators can be found in the recent exercise activities of the 
SDF.  GSDF and U.S. forces have worked together more closely in joint exercises such as 
FOREST LIGHT, YAMA SAKURA, and KEEN SWORD/KEEN EDGE in recent years 
offering both forces expanded opportunity for education and training.  Furthermore, of the three 
services, the MSDF is the best adapted to coalition operations through countless bilateral 
training exercises with the U.S. Navy.  It has been a long-time participant in the multilateral 
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises.  RIMPAC is a biennial large-scale multinational 
power projection/sea control exercise that began in the early 1980s.  In 2000, participants 
included the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Chile, and Great Britain.  
The SDF has also engaged in joint training with the Russian Navy in 1997 and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) Navy in 1999.218  Finally, the SDF itself has started working more closely 
together as one military rather than three separate services in response to the challenges of 
supporting its growing participation in overseas PKO.219  
 
c. Influence on Military Policy 
While the influence of the JSDF over defense policy remains relatively small, 
its senior members have become more assertive in recent years.  From 1954 to 1977 the JSDF 
leadership remained conspicuously silent on matters of defense policy.  Largely this was due to 
an unspoken taboo that SDF members should not question civilian authority in keeping with 
the “never again” resolutions.  In October 1977, this changed, however, with the appointment 
of General Kurisu Hiroomi.  From the very beginning, Kurisu loudly and publicly objected to 
the ambiguous policies and restrictions placed upon the SDF.  In particular, he criticized the 
government’s declared “defense only” strategy as stupid, saying “the history of war shows that 
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only offense can win.”220  For this and other provocative statements he was quickly fired.  
Nevertheless, the dam had been broken, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, senior SDF 
officers became more forthright concerning defense matters.  Such trends were demonstrated 
recently by the firing of JDA Vice Minister Nishimura Shingo in October 1999 after he made 
statements that Japan should rethink its non-nuclear policy and seek to create a modern 
equivalent of the wartime “Co-Prosperity Sphere.”  Finally, since the SDF has limited influence 
within its own administration, many senior JDA officials and JSDF officers frequently take 
employment in the defense industry upon retirement in a practice known as amakudari, or 
descent from heaven.221  This enables them to lobby for SDF issues as civilians.  Other active 
duty SDF members are more enterprising and have actually found it more effective to lobby 
their American military counterparts who then pressure Japanese politicians on issues of 
defense.222 
Such assertiveness is strongly opposed within the defense bureaucracy through 
several measures.223  First, the JDA hierarchy is made up almost solely of civilian bureaucrats 
who submit their policy proposals directly to civilian political leaders.  This often occurs 
without SDF senior officers knowing the particulars until after they are submitted.  Second, no 
senior SDF officer has ever held a top position in the JDA whether active duty or retired.  
Third, political authorities in the Diet as well as JDA bureaucrats frequently encourage 
interservice rivalry through the budget process.  This serves to dispel the threat of a “united 
front” by the SDF on defense issues. 
One avenue of recourse to the SDF is the JDA’s National Institute of Defense 
Studies (NIDS).  This government think tank conducts extensive research into military affairs.  
NIDS releases its analyses and other findings in a variety of publications including the widely 
read annual East Asian Strategic Review.  In its Report on Defense and Strategic Studies, 
Council of Defense-Strategic Studies 1999-2000, NIDS put forward its recommendations to the 
Japanese government concerning the SDF.  The report identified the following issues that must 
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be resolved in order for Japan to move forward with its goals of achieving an improved 
international leadership role:224 
• Permitting JSDF to participate in the practical duties of UN PKO (in other 
words, allowing them to be exposed to danger) 
• Enactment of a law to permit rear-area support of Multinational Forces 
• Enactment of emergencies legislation. 
• Adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
• Establishment of a system to promote the RMA 
• Relaxation of the constitutional interpretation regarding collective self-defense 
• Amendment of Constitution Article 9, Item Two 
 
As a whole, the SDF possesses limited influence over national military policy 
and little representation within the Japanese government.  An entrenched bureaucracy and a 
continuing social bias against members of the SDF create these limitations. 
 
C. MILITARY POSTURES 
Differences in political, economic, and military beliefs make it difficult for Japan to 
decide upon a suitable strategy for how, if at all, the Self-Defense Forces should be used in 
support of its international security interests.  Restated here, these interests have been 
determined to be: shaping a stable international security environment, supporting the United 
Nations, and upholding the Japan-United States alliance.  Wide ranges of potential military 
postures are available to Japan toward achieving these interests.  These generally fall within 
three distinct categories: pacifist internationalism, autonomy, and continued static ambivalence.  
Each of these potential military postures will be discussed in terms of their domestic support 
and their ability to satisfy Japan’s international security interests. 
 
1. Pacifistic Internationalism 
This posture represents an idealist vision for Japan’s future military policy.  Pacifist 
orientations believe that Japan should make “high-level and convincing” apologies to the 
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nations it harmed during its militaristic past.  They see the source of regional enmity as arising 
from this past and believe that by wholeheartedly pursuing acts of contrition other countries 
will behave more peacefully toward Japan.  This would abrogate the need for military force as 
a whole.225 
Political parties including the Japan Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, and 
the left wings of the Clean Government Party and the Democratic Party of Japan would support 
pacifistic internationalism.  Pacifist organizations such as Sokagakkai, and many student 
groups would also be in favor of this posture.  Notable individuals such as Murayama Tomiichi 
(JSP), Shii Kazuo (JCP, Chairman), Fuyushiba Tetsuzo (CGP General Secretary), Kaifu 
Toshiki (Independent), Kono Yohei (LDP), and Gotoda Masayoshi (LDP) would also likely be 
supporters.226     
A potential pacifistic internationalist posture would possess the following 
characteristics: 
• Heavy reliance upon multilateral security arrangements and international laws 
and organizations for international security 
• Minimal defense spending 
• Retention of strict constitutional prohibitions upon the SDF 
• No collective security arrangements with the United States or other foreign 
powers or agencies 
• Retention of strict legal constraints upon the exercise of military force 
• No multinational coalition participation 
• Minimal SDF role in PKO  
• Overseas dispatch of SDF limited to noncombatant units such as medical and 
construction teams, observers or weapons inspectors 
• International assistance largely through humanitarian aid, financial 
contributions, and civilian volunteer organizations 
 
Overall, the adoption of this posture would only partially satisfy Japan’s international 
security interests.  First, its greatest strength lies in its support of the United Nations.  Other 
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neutral and non-aggressive countries such as Sweden and Switzerland have made such 
contributions in the past and are well regarded by the international community for their 
efforts.227  Japan, however, possesses much greater resources than these countries and would 
therefore be expected to provide much more than they do.  Second, pacifistic internationalism 
provides only a modest contribution to shaping a stable international security environment.  
While it is true that domestic pacifists would welcome such a posture, as well as regional 
powers that fear increased Japanese military activity, it fails to provide a level of influence in 
the international arena that more forceful measures allow.  Finally, this posture fails to uphold 
the Japan-U.S. alliance since Washington expects a more active role from its most important 
and powerful ally. 
 
2. Autonomy 
This posture represents an independent and active Japanese military posture.  It 
envisions an expanded Japanese military capability unfettered by constitutional restraints.  
Japan would eagerly contribute its military power in support of international security interests.  
In addition, however, Japan would also more freely exercise military force in support of its own 
national self-interests.  Japan would provide for its own national defense, with or without an 
alliance to the United States.  In every respect, Japan would be a “normal” nation and a hopeful 
aspirant to a 19th century type of great power status in a developing multipolar world. 
At present, no significant Japanese political parties advocate such a harsh transition 
from the nation’s current military posture.  Only nationalist and ultraconservative groups avidly 
support forms of autonomy.  Notable individuals who advocate this course openly are few in 
number.  Tokyo mayor Ishihara Shintaro (LDP) and Kajiyama Seiroku (LDP) would be 
supporters.228 
A potential autonomous military posture would possess the following characteristics: 
• A primary reliance upon autonomous defense capabilities for national security 
• Preference for multilateral arrangements as secondary sources of security 
• A substantially weakened (or abolished) Japan-U.S. alliance 
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• Increased defense spending 
• Abrogation of constitutional prohibitions on military issues 
• Comprehensive collective security arrangements possible 
• Relaxed legal constraints upon the exercise of military force 
• Vigorous support of multinational coalitions 
• Unilateral use of military power in support of national self-interests 
• Wide-ranging SDF participation in PKO to include combatant units 
• Overall expanded SDF capability to permit support of globally deployed units 
Taken as a whole, the adoption of autonomy would fail to satisfy all three of Japan’s 
international security interests.  First, it would not create a stable security environment, 
particularly in Northeast Asia.  In fact, “it is difficult to conceive of any other single 
development more likely to spur an Asian arms race faster than Japan’s decision to unilaterally 
provide for its own security”.229  Additionally, no posture would strengthen the Japanese 
pacifist movement more than the adoption of such an overtly militaristic one as this.230  
Second, this posture implicitly calls for a diminished reliance upon and commitment to the 
United States.  Under this posture, “a real security crisis could lead to a [total] breakdown of the 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.”231  In the end, autonomy would do little to support the interests of 
the United Nations.  While Japan would achieve greater independence and national power, it 
“would have far less influence in global affairs.”232   
For a variety of reasons, it is highly unlikely that this posture would be adopted by 
Japan in its present condition.  However, its likelihood could increase if Japan experienced a 
natural or economic disaster of sufficient magnitude that would serve to strengthen the political 
platforms of the far right.233 
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3. Static Ambivalence or “More of the Same” 
This posture represents the current state of Japanese military policy, one that has 
prevailed since 1952 with relatively few significant changes.  In theory, it seeks to strike a 
comfortable balance between the two extremes of pacifism and autonomy.  In practice, its 
performance disappoints nearly everyone.  Static ambivalence continues to draw a halfhearted 
support from a majority of Japanese. 
The posture of static ambivalence possesses the following characteristics: 
• Heavy reliance upon the Japan-U.S. alliance for national security 
• Relatively low defense spending 
• A confused tangle of constitutional relaxations and prohibitions on military 
issues 
• No collective security arrangements with the United States or other foreign 
powers or agencies 
• Strict legal constraints upon the exercise of military force 
• Multinational coalition participation permitted in rear areas only 
• Minimal SDF role in PKO and generally limited to noncombatant units 
• Substantial international assistance largely through humanitarian aid, financial 
contributions, and civilian volunteer organizations 
Previous discussion of the policy of static ambivalence has demonstrated its inability to 
satisfy either domestic or international demands upon Japan.  It also only partially realizes 
Japan’s international security interests.  First, the limited and “start-stop” activities produced by 
static ambivalence make a relatively minor impact on shaping a stable international security 
environment.  Although this posture serves to maintain a balance of power in Northeast Asia, it 
does little for the security of the world outside the region.  Second, it also fails to achieve the 
goals of the United Nations by constraining the ability of Japan to contribute to UN missions in 
a manner that befits Japan’s economic and military potential.  Finally, this posture has served to 
create considerable difficulties within the Japan-U.S. alliance especially in the areas of defense 
burden sharing and combined military operations. 
None of these postures successfully attains Japan’s international security goals.  
Consequently, a new and more effective Japanese strategy must be found.  Chapter Four 













THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
71 
IV. THE CASE FOR MARTIAL INTERNATIONALISM 
Japan requires a new military posture in order to realize its international security goals.  
A pacifist option is unrealistic while an autonomous posture is too provocative and potentially 
destabilizing.  Efforts to find a compromise in the form of static ambivalence have worked in 
the past, but owing to constitutional restrictions, are becoming increasingly complicated and 
unable to meet the international security challenges of the 21st century.  Clearly, the best 
alternative is to find a middle ground between the policy paralysis of static ambivalence and the 
overt aggressiveness of an autonomous posture.  This chapter presents the case for Japanese 
martial internationalism as a possible solution to this strategic dilemma. 
   
A. THE STRATEGY 
This posture represents an assertive yet cooperative potential Japanese military posture.  
It envisions full Japanese military participation within multilateral security arrangements as 
well as within UN-sanctioned coalition operations.  Japan would assume a greater share of its 
own national defense while remaining allied to the United States.  The Japanese constitution 
would be revised to permit military activities accepted as norms by the international 
community and in accordance with the United Nations charter.  In essence, Japan would be a 
militarily “normal” nation, but one bound to and a vital component of international security 
regimes. 
A posture of martial internationalism would have the following characteristics: 
• National security achieved through a calculated mixture of autonomous 
capabilities and bilateral and multilateral alliances 
• Moderate defense spending 
• Amendment of constitutional prohibitions on military issues 
• Authorization of collective security arrangements with allied militaries 
• Continued legal constraints upon the exercise of military force 
• Full SDF participation in UN PKO and multinational coalitions 
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Martial internationalism supports all three of Japan’s international security interests.  
First, by contributing military power to UN-sanctioned multinational coalitions and 
peacekeeping operations, it actively supports the shaping of stable international security 
environment.  Such results are not possible by Japan acting unilaterally or even bilaterally 
within the Japan-U.S. alliance.  Second, martial internationalism dynamically supports the 
United Nations by supplying a level of effort commensurate with Japan’s capability to provide.  
Third, the posture upholds the Japan-U.S. alliance by permitting collective security 
arrangements with U.S. forces and active support of American operations in combat operations.  
For these reasons, martial internationalism represents an ideal potential Japanese strategic 
design. 
   For comparison, Table 1 compares martial internationalism to other postures with 
respect to specific security-related criteria. 
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B. DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The adoption of martial internationalism would dramatically affect Japan’s domestic 
situation.  Politically, this posture would find its strongest support from Ozawa Ichiro’s Liberal 
Party and conservative elements of the LDP and the DPJ.  It would be opposed by ardent 
advocates of pacifism in the JCP, SDP, and CGP and other organizations affiliated with the 
peace movement.  Public fears of resurgent militarism and ultra-nationalism would become 
important issues.  Additionally, Japan would be forced to determine its capacity for tolerating 
the combat deaths that would inherently and inevitably arise from a martial internationalism 
posture.  Although the influence of the political left has declined in recent years, such divisions 
would cause widespread public debate over the policy.  On the other hand, this healthy debate 
would encourage the resolution of the ongoing constitutional debate.  In the end, public opinion 
and national desire for greater autonomy and international prestige make the proposal of 
martial internationalism an achievable prospect.234 
Martial internationalism would have similar effects in Japan’s economic and military 
spheres.  Economically, Japanese business would be forced to bring its interests more in line 
with the security side of the comprehensive security triangle.  This would be a difficult 
transition given their historical predominance in Japanese foreign affairs policy-making.  On 
the other hand, martial internationalism would offer Japanese industry clear opportunities in 
defense production.  A more visible Japanese presence abroad would also raise global 
awareness of Japanese culture and products.  For the JSDF, martial internationalism offers 
innumerable benefits.  Among these would be improved morale, combat readiness, and social 
standing.  By representing Japan in humanitarian and multinational military efforts, the SDF 
would be viewed as contributing to the security of the international community rather than 
simply defending Japan against an implausible invasion. 
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C. REGIONAL OPPOSITION  
1. China 
China has traditionally resisted all Japanese military initiatives and would be the 
strongest foreign opponent of a martial internationalist posture.  As the historical center of 
power in East Asia, China continues to view its regional role as that of the “Middle Kingdom.”  
In both realist and ideological terms, China views Japan as an extension of “American 
hegemonism” and a competitor for regional influence.235  In a similar fashion, Japan has 
become increasingly concerned with China’s military modernization programs and burgeoning 
economic power.  Japan rejects Chinese aspirations to become a regional hegemon and fears 
losing its economic sway since “in Asia, China is now known as the country that faces its 
[economic] problems and resolves them, and this reputation has seriously undermined Japan’s 
aspirations to lead the region.”236 
In the midst of these apprehensions, trade between China and Japan expanded at an 
astonishing rate.  Bilateral trade swelled from $18.2 billion in 1990 to $62.4 billion in 1996 and 
continues to grow at a rapid rate.237  At present, Japan is China’s largest trading partner, and 
China is Japan’s second largest after the United States.238  Since the disintegration of the Soviet 
threat, relations between Japan and China have worsened in spite of this greater economic 
interdependence.239 
In the early 1990s, Sino-Japanese relations appeared warmer than ever before.  This 
began in 1978 when the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and Japan agreed to provide 
China with massive loans to assist China’s developing market economy reforms.  Throughout 
the 1980s, both countries shared a common strategic threat in form of the Soviet Union and a 
common partner in the United States.240  After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the 
United States distanced itself from China while Japan struggled to retain its growing 
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connections.  In 1990, Tokyo coordinated with Washington to relax embargoes placed on 
China thus staying in Beijing’s favor.241  When Japan passed its 1992 Peacekeeping 
Operations Bill, China was initially wary but then voiced uncharacteristic support for Japan’s 
military role in the Cambodian mission.242  In October 1992, both countries welcomed a 
chance at wartime reconciliation that resulted from the unprecedented visit of the Japanese 
emperor and empress to China.  The emperor made public statements of regret for suffering 
caused during World War Two and there was hope that issues of war history might finally be 
laid to rest.243 
At this time, relations began to deteriorate and have improved little since.  In 1992, 
China enacted a territorial waters act that encompassed the Senkaku islands, which the Chinese 
claim as the Diaoyutai islands.244  Later, in 1995, China conducted a series of nuclear tests 
against strong Japanese protests, especially from the disarmament movement.  In response, 
Japan threatened to cancel developmental assistance loans to China in an attempt to modify 
Beijing’s behavior.  Instead, China continued its tests until the following year, proving the 
weakness of Japanese economic levers upon Beijing.245    
In March 1996, China bracketed Taiwan with missile firings in an attempt to influence 
upcoming Taiwanese elections against voting for independence.  The United States responded 
by sending two carrier battlegroups to the Taiwan Straits as a demonstration of support to 
Taiwan and to deter further Chinese aggression.  Japan tried to stay out of the conflict, but the 
fact that the American Navy had deployed from Japanese bases exacerbated tensions between 
Beijing and Tokyo.  Furthermore, China saw Taiwan being included in Japan’s declared 
security interest of “areas surrounding Japan” contained in the 1995 NDPO and in the new 
Japan-U.S. “Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for 21st Century”.  These activities 
brought Sino-Japanese relations to an all-time postwar low.246 
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Japan recognizes the “one China principle” regarding Taiwan, but its non-specific 
attitude toward the issue irritates China.247  Japan and Taiwan have historically enjoyed a 
lucrative commercial bond in addition to common cultural connections.  In general, Japan 
desires to see a preservation of the status quo relationship between China and Taiwan.248  Even 
if accomplished peacefully, the unification of Taiwan and China would strengthen China’s 
military and strategic position in East Asia.  Worse, if China chooses to settle the issue by force, 
Japan would suffer economically and likely be drawn by the United States into a military 
conflict with China.     
Other recent events led to confrontations.  The Senkaku islands issue arose again in 
October 1996 when JMSA vessels blocked Chinese and Taiwanese protestors from 
approaching the islands after a Japanese right-wing group, the “Japan Youth Federation,” put a 
small lighthouse on one of the islets.249  The group then placed a shrine to war dead on the 
island in 2000.  Moreover, throughout this period China became increasingly infuriated with 
Japan’s insensitivity to wartime history issues.250  This included multiple visits by Japanese 
prime ministers to the Yasukuni shrine honoring Japan’s war dead, statements by several top 
leaders denying Japan’s culpability and actions during the war, and the publication of 
controversial history textbooks that downplayed Japanese war atrocities. 
Japan and China also have continually wrangled over the issue of modernization within 
their respective militaries and the prospects for future expansionism.  The Chinese government 
considers the Japan-U.S. alliance to have shifted its containment target from the defunct Soviet 
Union to China.  China sees joint research efforts by the United States and Japan in the area of 
theater missile defense as an indicator of this realignment.251  China also opposes Japan’s 
plan’s to extend its naval reach through the construction of refueling aircraft, helicopter carrier 
ships, and tank landing ships and “is determined that Japan not replace the United States as the 
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Asia-Pacific’s dominant maritime power.”252  Japan voices these same concerns regarding 
China’s naval buildup.  Specifically, they object to the Chinese purchase of Russian-built 
warships such as the aircraft carrier Varyag and a second Sovremenny-class destroyer as a basis 
for developing China’s own indigenous naval program.253  Conversely, these fears may be 
unfounded, however.  As much as Russian purchases permit short-term tactical advantages, 
Chinese power remains predominately land-bound.  Today, the Chinese navy continues to 
remain a coastal and defensively oriented force.254  Estimates range out to thirty years before 
the PRC could effectively project and sustain offshore military operations.255  Nonetheless, 
mutual mistrust in the area of military developments continues to strain the relationship.  Japan 
plans to reduce ODA assistance to China since, in its present state of economic difficulty; it 
feels it is unreasonable to give money to China when the PLA defense budget has been steadily 
increasing throughout the 1990s.256   
Despite these disputes, Japan and China share some areas of common agreement 
beyond purely economic ties.  One example is their treatment of North Korea.257  For many 
years, China backed the North Korean regime in its ideological confrontation with South 
Korean and the United States.  In recent years, Chinese support of the North Korean regime 
became less outspoken owing to frustration with the intractability of North Korea’s leadership.  
Japan and China agree that Korean unification should occur at a slow and measured pace so as 
not to incur a collapse of North Korea, mass migrations of refugees, and economic turmoil.  
Furthermore, China reluctantly concedes to the Japan-U.S. alliance to the alternative of an 
independent “normalized” Japan free of American restrictions on its actions.258  With regard to 
the Senkaku islands, on September 5, 2000, China agreed to stop intrusions by marine research 
vessels into Japan’s Economic Exclusion Zone and established a dialogue with Japan to 
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promote cooperative development of undersea resources in the area.259  China also recognizes 
the potential for Japan to eventually become a regional partner rather than adversary especially 
since a stronger Japan thwarts Russian designs in the region.260  Finally, the Chinese 
Communist Party is experiencing generational change.  This so-called “fourth-generation” of 
inner Party leadership is less ideologically driven than its predecessors and more inclined to 
pragmatic dealings with foreign nations, including Japan.261   
In sum, China would oppose Japan’s adoption of martial internationalism can do little 
about it.262  Economic manipulation works in Japan’s favor not China’s at this stage of Chinese 
economic development.  Furthermore, China’s perpetual use of history as a means to embarrass 
Japan into doing what it wants is having less and less effect upon a younger Japanese 
population.  One example of this occurred during the October 2001 Japan-China summit when 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin told Prime Minister Koizumi that “correctly treating historical 
issues is the political foundation for Sino-Japanese relations.”263  The statement resulted in 
widespread Japanese public outcry and signaled an end to the time when China will be able to 
effectively use this issue as a means of influence over Japan.  At the same time, in the context 
of discussions on Japan’s contributions to the War on Terrorism, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji 
told Koizumi that “the expansion of the overseas activity of the JSDF should be undertaken 
prudently.”264  This evidenced a marked change from previous harsh criticisms of Japanese 
military activity.  Although this may just have been a politically convenient comment given the 
widespread global support for the War on Terrorism, it may indicate a greater tolerance for a 
more active Japanese military role in support of multinational coalitions. 
 
2. North Korea 
The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) shares China’s ideological and 
realist opposition to increased Japanese military activity.  Many Japanese see North Korea as 
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“consistently accusatory, pointing the finger on every possible occasion.”265  In contrast to 
China, however, the DPRK remains far more isolated from the world and has much smaller 
economic connections to Japan.  Japan views North Korea as the greatest threat to its national 
security as well as the security of Northeast Asia as a whole.266 
Japan has experienced a decade of anxiety regarding North Korean.  Although North 
Korea had entered the United Nations along with South Korea in 1991, it remained as 
belligerent as ever toward its southern neighbors.  In 1993 a North Korean test firing of a 
Nodong-1 ballistic missile provoked fears within the JSDF that “the Soviet ‘evil empire’ had 
vanished only to be replaced by a ‘little evil empire’”267 SDF leaders lobbied the government 
strongly for a return to the Nakasone era cooperation with Washington on missile defense 
systems.  Their fears proved prescient when, on Aug 31, 1998, the DPRK launched a new 
missile type, the Taep'o-dong-1, this time flying it over Hokkaido.  This and the subsequently 
designed Taep’o-dong-2 are designed as three-stage intercontinental ballistic missiles capable 
of striking any targets in the Japanese home islands.  No other event in the 1990s brought home 
to Japan more forcefully the realization of their precarious security situation in Northeast 
Asia.268 
Other issues continue to mar the relationship between Japan and North Korea.  At a 
broad level, North Korea unfavorably views Japan’s association with the United States and the 
implications of American categorizing of the DPRK as a “rogue state” and a member of the 
“axis of evil.”269  In a similar light, North Korea condemns Japan’s growing closeness to South 
Korea.  On a smaller scale, Pyongyang shares in the same rhetoric as China regarding Japanese 
treatment of its war record. 
Japan is troubled by North Korea for many reasons.  First, Japan fears North Korea’s 
persistent development of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles in addition to 
its nuclear weapons potential.270  Second, Japan remains angry at North Korea for abducting as 
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many as a dozen young Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s to be used in training spies.  Third, 
over the years, Japan and North Korea have engaged in numerous cat and mouse chases at sea 
when suspected DPRK intelligence-gathering ships intruded into Japan’s territorial waters.271  
In 1999, this resulted in JMSA firing warning shots at a fleeing North Korean vessel.  A similar 
situation repeated itself in December 2001 that resulted in the sinking of a North Korean ship.  
Finally, despite recent assurances by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to the contrary, Japan 
fears that that the expected breaking of the KEDO (Korean Energy Development Organization) 
promise to provide light-water reactors to the DPRK by 2003 (not seriously going to be 
finished until 2008) may result in another round of missile tests.272 
Even with all of these points of contention, Japan and North Korea found agreement in 
a few areas during the 1990s.  In 1991, a joint Japan-Russian UN Development Project in the 
Tyumen River region represents a potential source of reconciliation between Japan and the 
DPRK.273  North Korea also favorably viewed Japanese participation in brokering the KEDO 
as well as financial and technical assistance in constructing safe nuclear power systems in 
North Korea.  Relations have also improved with North Korea’s agreement to release Japanese 
Red Army terrorists that found refuge in North Korea over thirty years ago.274 
  A major breakthrough in Japan-DPRK relations occurred on September 17, 2002 with 
the first ever summit between a Japanese Prime Minister and a North Korean leader.275  Prime 
Minister Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang and “expressed regret,” but not a formal apology, for 
Japan’s war history.276  In return, Kim Jong Il agreed to allow at least four Japanese, whom 
DPRK intelligence agents had previously abducted, to return home.  He has stated that they are 
the last living Japanese hostages remaining in North Korea.277  In addition, he promised 
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Koizumi that spy ship activities in Japanese waters would cease.278  The resolution of these 
sensitive issues will stand as a landmark achievement in the two countries’ relations.  
North Korea’s likely opposition to a Japanese posture of martial internationalism can 
be discounted as a significant factor.  In many ways, its rhetoric would have far less impact 
than challenges coming from China.  Although North Korea poses a direct security threat to 
Japan through its missile program, it is highly unlikely that it would risk the massive retaliation 
of the United States by threatening Japan in a manner similar to what it previously did in 1998. 
 
D. REGIONAL ANXIETY 
1. South Korea 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) would experience considerable anxiety over Japan 
adopting a posture of martial internationalism given its past “uneasy” feelings toward Japan’s 
participation in UN PKO.279  Mutual apprehension arises from a longstanding Japanese 
impression of southern Korea as a “dagger pointed at Japan’s heart” as well as Korean views 
that Japan sees Korea as a Japanese “bridge to the Asian mainland.”280  Accordingly, careful 
management of this crucial relationship would be required.  Contemporary Japan-ROK 
relations are less favorable than would be expected from countries that share a common ally in 
the United States.  To a large extent, South Koreans feel a “sense of dissatisfaction” regarding 
Japan and a decrease in the friendliness that prevailed from 1998-1999.281 
Japan-ROK relations suffered from a variety of disagreements during the 1990s.  
Hopeful prospects began with a visit in 1990 by Emperor Akihito and in 1993 by Prime 
Minister Hosokawa.  In both cases, each expressed heartfelt regret at the abuses of the past.282  
In the midst of these apologies, however, the issue of “comfort women” became increasingly 
public.  Starting in 1991, many Korean women began testifying openly of their treatment 
during the Second World War.  Since as many as 139,000 of these women had been forced into 
labor as prostitutes for the Japanese army, lawsuits against the Japanese government mounted 
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in number “like vengeful ghosts.”283  Through a settlement with these women, the Japanese 
government established a fund for assisting them and their families but it was largely 
unsatisfactory since many women simply wanted hard cash and not social programs.  Further 
frustrations of a lesser nature occurred concerning the possession of the Takeshima/Tokdo 
islands lying between Japan and South Korea and perpetual arguments over fishing rights.  
These disputes deepened further with Japan’s irritation with Russia for permitting South 
Korean fishing ventures in the seas around the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands.  Like China 
and North Korea, South Korea has been deeply frustrated with Japanese handling of wartime 
historical issues.  This anger peaked when Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni shrine 
in August 2001 in the midst of the continuing Japanese textbook controversy.  In a spectacular 
display of protest, twenty men in Seoul severed their little fingers in protest.284 
The subject of Korean unification, in the words of Michael Green, remains the “500-
pound gorilla” among the variables in the Japan-ROK relationship.285  Many South Koreans 
believe that Japan fears the unification of the peninsula and the altered strategic balance of 
power such an event would bring.  They feel that Japan generally praises efforts at 
reconciliation while secretly hoping that it occurs later rather than sooner.  On the other hand, 
they appreciate the firm commitment Japan has made toward bringing about a measured 
unification process through financial assistance and open dialogue with Pyongyang.286 
In many ways, these insinuations are well founded.  Because of historical influences, 
“Korean patriotism is anti-Japanism.”287  Japan fears that once Korea unifies, it may fall into 
the orbit of China and increase its power.  In addition, Japan knows that neither China nor the 
new Korea will ever tolerate a massive American military presence on the peninsula.288  This 
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would precipitate an American withdrawal from the region that would either fall back on 
overly burdened Japanese bases or further east into the Pacific where their presence would be 
less visible in the region.  If the latter occurred, Japan would almost certainly feel threatened 
and seek to ensure its own defense autonomously.  This would spark a regional arms race 
damaging to everyone. 
In the face of these pressures, Japan and South Korea have struggled to improve their 
relationship.  Foremost, trade and economic activity between the two countries exceeds $50 
billion annually.  South Korea benefited greatly from Japanese loans during the 1997-1998 
Asian financial crisis.289  Japan and the ROK established numerous security dialogues in the 
past ten years and warships of both nations visited the other’s countries for the first time since 
the normalization of relations in 1965.  The common bond of the United States also worked to 
improve relations between the two countries through the establishment of the Trilateral 
Coordination and Oversight Group in 1999.290  Although this body has yet to accomplish 
significant military cooperation between Japan and South Korea, it is a foundation from which 
to work in the future. 
Thus, while South Korea is anxious about a more militarily active Japan, there is 
common ground to work upon to improve the relationship.  One possibility is that Japanese 
military involvement in UN activities actually might spark greater military cooperation 
between South Korea and Japan if they were involved in the same operation in a distant and 
neutral setting.  As Victor Cha pointed out, “while history may tinge interaction between Japan 
and Korea, it is the larger geostrategic concerns that ultimately determine outcomes.”291 
 
2. Russia 
Russia would greet a Japanese adoption of martial internationalism with mixed feelings 
and concern.  Russia continues to see Japan in the light of its role in the American Cold War 
coalition, in addition to its much longer history of competition for influence in Northeast Asia.  
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Likewise, Japan continues to feel that Russia “is a troublesome and threatening neighbor.”292  
Significantly, Russia and Japan still have yet to sign a peace treaty ending the Second World 
War between them and trade activity is negligible.  As with South Korea, a changed Japanese 
military posture will require careful handling of Japan-Russian relations. 
  Japanese relations with newly reorganized Russia fared little better than they had been 
with the Soviet Union.  Despite statements of perestroika and glasnost, many Japanese found it 
difficult to relax their guard concerning their old foe.  The 1992 Japanese Defense White Paper 
stated this clearly, declaring that although the Cold War had ended, the threat of Russia 
remained.293  The later popularity of Russian ultra-nationalist Zhirinovsky in 1993, concerns 
over Russian political stability, and continued failure to reach a settlement over the Northern 
Territories/Kurile Islands sustained these trends.  A 1993 Yeltsin-Hosokawa summit in which 
Russia offered trade and economic development concessions to Japan also failed to achieve any 
significant results due to fears that money invested in Russia would be lost in a “black hole” of 
instability.294   
Japan and Russia deviate on many military issues as well.  Russian sales of high-tech 
weaponry to China, especially naval vessels, continue to irritate Japan.  Mutual distrust has also 
influenced Moscow to maintain a large proportion of their limited military forces in Russia’s 
far eastern military districts just as in the Soviet-era.295  Despite this land-based threat, 
however, Japanese fears of any naval threat have greatly diminished owing to the dilapidated 
state of the Russian Pacific Fleet.  Most analysts believe that even if Russia devoted renewed 
interest in rebuilding the fleet, it will take many years to recover from the damage caused by 
neglect during the 1990s.296  As a final point, tensions between the two countries heightened 
over Russia’s negative reaction to Japan’s proposed implementation of ballistic missile defense 
systems.297   
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Some measures of rapprochement occurred in recent years.  Indicators of this were 
Japanese initiatives to include Russia more thoroughly in sessions of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, an organization devoted to promoting greater security and military stability in the 
Asian-Pacific region.  The previously mentioned Tyumen river project is another example and 
represents a prospect for greater Japanese economic assistance to Russia in developing Siberian 
resources in coming years.298  Finally, both Japan and Russia share a common concern over 
Chinese military developments. 
Taken as a whole, none of these difficulties stand as insurmountable obstacles to 
Japan’s adoption of martial internationalism.  While Russia remains a potent military power, its 
energies are too taxed in managing its many internal difficulties to effectively counter a 
Japanese military posture shift.  In fact, such an action would have an exactly opposite affect by 
stirring Japanese nationalism in an unfavorable direction for Russia. 
 
E. INTERNATIONAL ENCOURAGEMENT 
1. The United States 
In 2002, Japan has no stronger foreign relationship than with the United States.  It is 
Japan’s only ally and the guarantor of its national security.  Fully 30 percent of Japanese 
exports are sold in the United States and 19 percent of its imports are American products.299  
Given this close affiliation and a growing strategic consensus, the United States would likely be 
an ardent supporter of Japanese martial internationalism. 
Japan-U.S. ties suffered in the early 1990s but have improved ever since.  The Gulf 
War and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union led many Americans to believe that Japan 
might rise as future adversary.  Popular writings such as George Friedman and Meredith 
Lebard’s The Coming War with Japan and Ishihara Shintaro’s The Japan That Can Say No 
played upon these fears in both countries.  The creation of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) in 1993 aroused Japanese suspicions that they were being purposefully excluded to 
contain their economy.300  Nonetheless, agreements such as the 1996 “Joint Declaration on 
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Security – Alliance for 21st Century” and the 1997 “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation” demonstrated the vitality of the alliance. 
From an American perspective, the alliance is the most critical component of the 
several regional bilateral agreements maintained by the United States.  Foremost, through its 
provisions the United States enjoys the ability to permanently position a wide variety of 
conventional military forces and intelligence-gathering assets across an enormous geographic 
area.  Nearly 41,000 U.S. armed forces personnel serve in Japan with the Japanese government 
contributing “$4.86 billion in host-nation support, the most of any U.S. ally.”301  This amounts 
to over 75 percent of U.S. basing costs and a considerable cost-savings for the United States if 
the same forces were based on American soil.  This geographic placement of American power 
gives the United States the ability to directly influence the course of events along much of the 
eastern periphery of continental Asia.  This means to project power is impossible to duplicate 
from other U.S. bases or even with deployed naval forces.302  A move toward martial 
internationalism would improve the effectiveness of America’s defense structure, particularly 
through better coordination between the U.S. military and the JSDF and the establishment of 
collective security instruments.303 
The nature of the Japan-U.S. alliance confers both political advantages and 
disadvantages upon the United States.  Beneficially, the alliance satisfies American desires for 
bilateral arrangements that it can more easily orchestrate than those provided by multilateral 
systems.304  In addition, the alliance has historically supplied the United States with a reliable 
and influential political partner in the international arena. 
In contrast, the alliance also creates negative political reactions both domestically and 
internationally.  Domestically, American isolationists continue to call for the withdrawal of 
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overseas American military forces, particularly in Asia, where their presence exposes them to 
danger and agitates foreign attitudes towards the United States.  This viewpoint often acts in 
conjunction with the belief that the Japanese have enjoyed a “free ride” within the alliance.  
This has been borne out in numerous U.S. Department of Defense reports that criticize Japan’s 
limited contributions to international security.305  Some Americans argue that if Japan 
continues to be recalcitrant toward its duties as a military partner, the United States may be 
better served by “finding a new friend” in Asia willing to share the burden of regional 
security.306 
From a Japanese perspective, the relationship offers both strengths and challenges.  On 
the positive side, the alliance provides Japan with the assurance of security from the world’s 
most powerful nation.  This protection enables Japan to focus its strategic interests on resource 
and economic development and less on defense issues.  Even Japan’s vital sources of Middle 
East oil are ensured by the United States through its military and diplomatic policies.  The 
alliance also provides Japan with substantial improvements to its own defensive capabilities 
through military technology transfers such as AEGIS weapons systems, F-15 fighters, elements 
of ballistic missile defense, and the American “nuclear umbrella.” 
The alliance also creates several negative factors affecting Japan’s perception of its 
strategic security.307  Primarily, the Japan-U.S. alliance makes Japan a target for those opposed 
to the United States anywhere in the world.  This was overwhelmingly clear during the Cold 
War when Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons were targeted against American military 
facilities in Japan from only a short distance away.  Secondly, the alliance inhibits the freedom 
of Japan to make significant foreign policy decisions on its own interest.  Finally, as previously 
discussed, little coordination exists regarding joint command and control of American and 
Japanese military forces if Japan was attacked by an outside power. 
Under the alliance, Japan experiences a similar division of advantages and 
disadvantages in the political and social realms.  First, Japanese society profits enormously by 
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concentrating on its internal development over its maintenance of military power.  A second 
positive factor lies in the fact that Japan does wield some degree of influence over the United 
States concerning the basing of forces in Japan.308  Although seldom used overtly, the potential 
of this pressure gives Tokyo a measure of flexibility in dealing with Washington over its 
policies toward Japan.  Finally, although viewed by some as a negative characteristic, the 
Japan-U.S. alliance continues to shape Japanese internal politics by attracting voter attention to 
defense issues that would normally take a back seat to domestic fiscal concerns.309 
Politically and socially, Japan suffers some hindrances because of the alliance.  First, 
the interests of the United States dominate Japanese foreign policy.310  This profoundly affects 
the Japanese independent self-image and provokes nationalistic and anti-American sentiment.  
Related to this is the considerable public unrest concerning the numbers, type, and behavior of 
American forces stationed in Japan and the structure of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA).311  This is particularly evident on the island of Okinawa, where crimes 
committed by U.S. troops against the local population continue to generate calls for American 
withdrawal.  Many Japanese believe that dependence upon the United States limits their 
options internationally and acts against their desire to be more involved in multilateral 
arrangements.312  Since 2000, the United States has aggravated Japan by its refusal to adopt 
environmental agreements, such as the Kyoto accord, and by its confrontational and unilateral 
foreign policy.313 
Finally, a persistent fear of abandonment by the United States exists in Japan.  
Terashima Jitsuro, President of Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute, expressed this view 
saying: 
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• The U.S. is pursuing a dual diplomacy toward China and Japan 
• Japan has become relatively less important 
• It is not normal for a foreign country to maintain its military in another 
independent country for so long 
• The United States will protect Japan only within the framework of its own 
strategy and domestic public opinion at the time that a situation arises.314 
Overall, despite such views, most Japanese and Americans realize the value of the 
alliance and the close relationship between the two countries.  The United States would likely 




The countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represent a 
further source of support for Japanese martial internationalism.315  While this support would 
not be nearly as strong as that of the United States and would differ from country to country, it 
represents a fundamental shift in how the countries of Southeast Asia view Japan.  
Japanese attitudes toward the nations of ASEAN shifted following the fall of Saigon 
and the ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1975.  Beginning in 1977, Japanese leaders formulated 
policies known as nemawashi, or “laying the groundwork,” toward establishing better relations 
with Southeast Asia.  First, Japan entered into a Japan-ASEAN Forum to discuss regional 
security and economic development issues in March of 1977.  Later, in August of that year, 
Prime Minister Fukuda proclaimed three tenets of his “Fukuda Doctrine,” with special 
emphasis on Southeast Asia.  In this doctrine, Fukuda stated that Japan would not become a 
military power again, that its economic links with ASEAN nations were founded on “heart-to-
heart” relationships, and that it would “foster relationships based on mutual understandings”.316  
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Lastly, while these declarations somewhat alleviated ASEAN apprehensions concerning Japan, 
the later American Plaza Accord of 1985 acted as an even more robust facilitator of Japanese 
interest in the region.  This occurred because of swiftly appreciating yen values, higher costs of 
production in Japan itself, and the subsequent relocation of many Japanese enterprises and 
industries to the cheaper labor pools of Southeast Asia.317  Japanese foreign relations within 
this region thrived during this period as a function of increased economic activity. 
During the 1990s, Japan’s relations with ASEAN improved with economic 
interdependence.  Specifically, Japan maintained sizeable interest in Indonesia as its country of 
greatest concern in the region.  The large population and market for Japanese goods, possession 
of raw materials, including oil, and the geostrategic location of the islands as they straddle 
Japan’s vital trans-oceanic sea lanes all acted as contributing factors to this interest.318  The 
inclusion of Japan as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) beginning in 1994 also 
evidenced Japan’s maintenance of linkages to the region.319  A major setback to positive 
relations occurred during the Asian economic crisis of 1997 when ASEAN nations expected 
solutions from Japanese financial leadership.  Given Japan’s own internal economic 
difficulties, Japanese proposals, including the Asian Monetary Fund, failed to achieve 
significant results.  This diminished Southeast Asian faith in Japan’s regional economic 
leadership.320 
To counter these accusations, Japan engaged in numerous “confidence building 
measures” with ASEAN nations during the 1990s.  These included exchange of unclassified 
information, maritime cooperation, nuclear non-proliferation, and the control and transfer of 
conventional weapons.321  Japan’s military role in the UN PKO in Cambodia and East Timor 
were heralded as positive developments in Japan-Southeast Asian relations resulting in “little 
concern…over a more active Japanese naval presence in the region.”322  Finally, in November 
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1999, Japan proposed that ships of the JMSA join with Malaysian, Indonesian, and 
Singaporean patrols in the Strait of Malacca.323  This multinational coast guard would have 
enhanced powers against piracy and crime.  The proposal was met with favorably and one 
expert in Indonesia recognized it as an important step toward Japan’s future involvement in 
regional security.324 
Thus Japan’s efforts at improving relations with Southeast Asia eventually paid off in 
the form of greater ease with Japanese military activity.  In many places, such as the 
Philippines, war memories remain as strong as in China or the Korean peninsula.  Nevertheless, 
the favorable response to Japanese involvement in the region indicates that the nations of 
ASEAN would probably support Japanese martial internationalism. 
 
3. The United Nations 
A Japanese decision to adopt martial internationalism would have far-reaching effects 
upon Japan’s standing in the United Nations.  Japan has always been an enthusiastic political 
and financial supporter of the United Nations and seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council.325  Through an active military contribution to United Nations efforts, Japan may 
finally be able to attain this goal. 
Japan argues that it deserves this elevated rank for four main reasons.326  First, it has 
made military contributions to peacekeeping since 1992 and substantial civilian/NGO support 
of UN missions long before that.  Second, it asserts its financial contributions are, with the 
exception of the United States, far more than what other UNSC members contribute making it 
the second largest donor in the world.  In 2000, Japan paid for 20.6 percent of the UN’s costs 
second only to the United States’ 39 percent.  The other permanent members contributed far 
less: China 1 percent, Russia 1.1 percent, UK 5.1 percent, and France 6.5 percent.  
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Additionally, since 1989 Japan has been the largest provider of overseas developmental 
assistance.  Third, Japan is a longtime supporter of arms control and non-proliferation.  Fourth, 
Japan has served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for eight terms, a feat 
matched only by Brazil. 
Beyond these facts, Japanese leadership also made substantial contributions to UN 
activities.  Japan has made huge contributions to African development during the 1990s when 
other major powers lost interest in the continent following the end of the Cold War.327  This 
was evidenced by its hosting of two international conferences on African Development in 1992 
and 1998.  Pragmatically, this move was taken given that Africa possesses the largest regional 
bloc of votes in the UN General Assembly.  In 1998, Japan, with Great Britain, was 
instrumental in resolving a UN crisis over weapons inspectors in Iraq.328  This was an 
unprecedented display of leadership by Japan.  In its junior role as a non-permanent member of 
the UNSC, Japan has traditionally played a relatively unseen part in major negotiations.  
Finally, Japan has had past support for its bid from three of the five current permanent UNSC 
members, namely, the United States, Great Britain, and France. 
Even with all of these achievements, Japan faces significant obstacles to attaining a 
leadership position in the United Nations.  Many of these arise because of its current ineffectual 
military policy.  First, Japan’s lack of collective self-defense policy goes against 1995 UN 
guidelines on PKO.  Second, the 1992 PKO bill remains overly restrictive in its requirements 
that must be met before the SDF can become involved in a PKO mission.  This is particularly 
true of the stipulation that warring parties must have signed a peace treaty.  Third, many 
countries would feel that the permanent inclusion of Japan on the UNSC would be the height of 
hypocrisy in that Japan would be making decisions to send other countries’ troops into harms’ 
way while theirs remain free from risk.  Finally, being on the UNSC involves demonstrating 
positive and proactive leadership.  In other words, this implies that Japan must be a “normal 
country” and not simply a perceived vassal of the United States. 
Conversely, many other impediments exist that are out of Japan’s control.329  For 
instance, modification of the UNSC first requires the consent of the presiding five members.  It 
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is unlikely that China or Russia would support Japan’s bid.  Furthermore, a two-thirds majority 
vote of the General Assembly is required to alter the UNSC.  At present, Japan is also unlikely 
to gain this much support.  Many nations in the General Assembly feel that the inclusion of 
Japan on the UNSC would give excessive influence to the United States, particularly if 
Germany were included also.  Additionally, they reject the idea of adding yet another 
“Westernized” and wealthy country of the geopolitical “North” to the UNSC while Africa, 
South America, the Muslim world, and India are not represented.330 
In consequence, by adopting martial internationalism, Japan can surmount many of the 




F. THE WAR ON TERRORISM – A LOST OPPORTUNITY? 
The current global War on Terrorism presents Japan with an ideal starting point for 
implementing a strategy of martial internationalism.  No other enemy is as universally reviled 
as terrorists, be they Islamist or otherwise.  Moreover, terrorist acts by “Super-Empowered 
Angry Men” will continue to plague the security of the international community long after 
individual organizations like Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are eradicated.331  Japan is certainly 
no stranger to terrorism, having experienced the violence of groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, 
Chukaku-ha, and the Japanese Red Army.332  In some respects, the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas 
attacks in Tokyo in March 1995 that killed 7 and injured over 4000 people marked the 
beginning of a new kind of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction.  Joining in the fight 
against this global scourge satisfies all three of Japan’s international security goals, and yet 
Japan continues to drift in a state of military policy sluggishness. 
In a recent article in Foreign Affairs magazine, Eric Heginbotham and Richard 
Samuels described Japan’s current activity in the War on Terrorism as a “dual-hedge.” 333  
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They claim that Japan is, once again, striving to maintain close business relations with its 
Middle East oil trading partners, while at the same time, engaging in symbolic demonstrations 
of support for the United States through extremely limited military support of operations in 
Afghanistan.  Although Koizumi made strong pronouncements in his “Seven Point Plan,” after 
the cameras were off, Japan “backtracked on the bolder elements of…the plan.”334  As a result, 
Japan appears to be falling into the same pitfalls it did eleven years ago in the Gulf War. 
To Japan’s credit, Koizumi’s government managed to construct the “Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law” at lightning speed by Japanese policy-making standards and against 
strong political resistance.  Public opinion won the day with 57 percent of Japanese polled 
supporting the dispatch of the SDF to support the American war effort.335  The new law, 
however, proved to be yet another half-measure at true military policy reform.  It failed to 
address the potential consequences of sending the SDF into multinational operations without 
collective security arrangements or provisions for use of force. 
Japanese military participation in the War on Terrorism is noteworthy especially given 
that the last time Japan was an active member of a multinational coalition was during the Boxer 
Rebellion in 1900.  In November 2001 MSDF ships deployed to the Indian Ocean and began 
working with coalition forces.  By the end of 2001, the MSDF had provided fleet refueling 
capability through 75 at-sea replenishments of coalition ships that provided 34.1 million gallons 
of diesel fuel to American and British vessels at Japanese expense.  In addition, ASDF C-130 
aircraft completed 51 missions consisting of 166 sorties with 773 tons of cargo and 123 
passengers in support of re-supply and transport requirements in the western Pacific Ocean.336  
Several C-130’s also made it all the way to Pakistan to deliver blankets and humanitarian relief 
supplies before quickly leaving the area.337  Throughout all of this, China and South Korea did 
not seriously condemn Japanese military activism in the war on terror.338 
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Then, beginning in February 2002, the United States military began to reevaluate its 
praise of its ally.  In a Department of Defense statement on February 26, 2002, Japan was not 
listed among the coalition forces contributing to the War on Terrorism.339  Shortly after, the 
U.S. Central Command website stopped displaying listings of Japan’s contribution to the war, a 
situation that has continued to the time of this writing.340 
Clearly, something happened that changed Japan’s position on its participation in the 
war.  From a security standpoint, Japan feared the threat of increased terrorism to Japan.  
Politically, the cautiousness of senior leaders outweighed the enthusiasm of junior politicians 
and public opinion alike.341  Most importantly, Japan feared the economic backlash from the 
Muslim world that overly aggressive activity in the region might bring.  Reminiscent of the 
Gulf War, Japan did not wish to disturb the lucrative trading relationships it had established in 
the area, especially with Iran.342 
As a lesson to Japan, the most promising development to arise from the War on 
Terrorism in Afghanistan has been the return of Germany and Italy to the international security 
community.  Both countries possess constitutions that renounce war and both have made 
impressive contributions to the international effort against Al-Qaeda.  To date, over 2,500 
German military personnel have operated in Operation Enduring Freedom at sea, in the air, and 
through numerous operations on the ground including the use of German special forces.343  
Italy, whose constitutional restrictions on use of force are stricter than Germany or Japan’s, 
contributed over 450 ground personnel, numerous aircraft, and a remarkable 13 percent of its 
entire naval inventory including its carrier battle group to support combat operations in the 
Northern Arabian Sea.344  Indeed, Kyorin University Professor Takubo Tadae remarked on this 
situation saying, “Japan should learn from Germany which has acted on rearmament, NATO 
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membership and international military cooperation in response to changes in the international 
environment.”345  Alternatively, too many parallels cannot be made between the two countries 
since, unlike Germany, Japan has not been a member of any multilateral institutions that 
fostered public political support for defense.  As a result, “the political threshold that needs to 
be crossed before the Self-Defense Forces can engage in combat is much higher in Japan than 
in Germany.”346  Even so, it is evident that once again, Japan is missing an historic opportunity 
to rejoin the international community as a normal nation. 
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This thesis has demonstrated that Japan can best satisfy its international security 
interests by assuming a combatant role in current and future multinational military coalitions.  
Japan’s international security interests were identified as: (1) shaping a stable international 
security environment, (2) supporting the United Nations, and (3) upholding the Japan-United 
States alliance.  While other military postures can partially satisfy some of these interests, only 
martial internationalism can achieve all three successfully. 
To defend this argument, the thesis addressed several relevant questions.  First, the 
evolution of Japan’s defense policy was examined.  This study revealed that Japan has steadily 
progressed from pacifism to a more independent and assertive military posture, especially since 
the end of the Cold War. 
Second, the thesis explored the nature of Japan’s contemporary military policy debate.  
By describing Japan’s political, economic, and military situations, a multitude of competing 
interests and institutional complexities were discovered.  Furthermore, these interests focused 
centrally upon the critical issues of constitutional revision, collective security, and the use of 
force by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.  The manner in which these issues were viewed led 
each competing interest to prefer different military postures, namely pacifistic internationalism, 
autonomy, static ambivalence, or martial internationalism.  By comparing these postures in 
terms of Japan’s international security interests and domestic factors, martial internationalism 
rose to the fore.   
Third, the thesis identified the potential domestic and international implications of 
Japan assuming a martial internationalist stance.  While widespread domestic debate was 
determined to be a likely result, this was also not proven a disqualifying factor for the posture’s 
feasibility.  Next, Japan’s international relations were discussed in relation to martial 
internationalism.  Again, although China and North Korea represented the most likely sources 
of opposition, these concerns were not overpowering enough to prevent the adoption of the 
posture.  Instead, the support of the United States, Southeast Asia, and the global community as 
100 
represented by the United Nations all outweighed the mitigating factors of countries opposed or 
apprehensive of increased Japanese military activity. 
Finally, with a firm grasp of the strategy in hand, the thesis determined that the current 
War on Terrorism is an ideal starting place for Japan to enact a posture of martial 
internationalism.  This was accomplished by identifying Japan’s present policy ambivalence 
and how it would damage its international prestige if continued through the course of the 
conflict.         
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommend that Japan pursue a military policy of martial internationalism as 
described in this thesis.  To effectively accomplish this Japan must: 
 
1. Amend Article 9 of the constitution to relax prohibitions on military activities. 
 
2. Enact legislation to exercise the right of collective defense as described by UN  
Charter Article 51. 
 
3. Establish rules of engagement and use of force laws that comply with the 
International Law of Armed Force. 
 
4. Improve training and combat readiness of JSDF for future multinational coalition 
and peacekeeping missions through vigorous exercises with the United States 
military. 
 
5. When called for, actively and fully participate in UN-sanctioned coalition 
operations sharing the same risks and burdens as other democratic nations. 
 
 
Recommend that the United States assist its ally Japan in implementing a military 
posture of martial internationalism through the following steps: 
 
1. Utilize American diplomatic influence throughout Asia-Pacific to soothe fears 
concerning the renewal of Japanese militarism. 
 
2. Welcome and encourage Japan’s decision to become a normal nation. 
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3. Fully integrate SDF forces into U.S. military formations and operations in training 
exercises and real-world operations.347 
 
4. Establish a free trade agreement with Japan to cement the bonds between Japan and 
the United States.  As Japanese dependence upon the United States lessens in 
matters of defense, a free trade agreement would demonstrate U.S. support of 
floundering Japanese economy and bring to an end the cycle of trade-related 
disputes between Japan and the United States as well as stopping the practice of 
gaiatsu that is so disparaged in Japan.348 
 
5. Revise the Japan-U.S. alliance to reflect Japan’s greater military autonomy and 
collective security agreements with the United States. 
 
In closing, threats to international security continue to flourish in the post-Cold 
War world.  Although the United States has assumed the burden of “global policeman,” 
this arrangement cannot be sustained forever.  This thesis has demonstrated Japan’s 
ability to share international security responsibilities with the United States and the 
United Nations.  However, the question remains whether Japan will overcome its military 
policy ambivalence before other powers take up the challenge and make Japanese 
influence less consequential.    
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